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Abstract.  We test the extent of parental forgone consumption used instead to invest in 
children’s human capital by use of intrahousehold resource allocation models.  Using an 
unusual, comprehensive data set for urban China, we find more spending on boys aged 
13-15 but more on girls aged 16-18, suggesting that standard human capital theories and 
traditional perceptions of gender bias do not completely explain educational expenditure 
decisions.  The evidence from urban China is consistent, though, with human capital 
models which consider parental intertemporal preferences.  Also, our findings suggest 
that the perceived bias in favour of sons exists weakly in contemporary urban China. 
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1
The possibility of bias for sons is an often-asked question in China. The 
one-child policy may have popularised the traditional view of a preference for boys.  This 
paper investigates patterns in household expenditure on the education of sons and 
daughters to analyse whether there are such gender biases in contemporary urban China.  
We aim to measure the extent of forgone consumption of parents that is spent instead on 
the education of their children as a test of the models of parental investment in children’s 
human capital by using a strand of empirical models known as the intrahousehold 
resource allocation approach.  Finally, we will discern whether any such gender 
differences generate effects such as differential school enrolment rates of boys and girls 
with policy implications for gender inequality in China.    
This paper will first review the educational system of China, focusing on 
gender differences in school enrolment as an indicator of human capital.  This is followed 
by a model of parental investment in children’s human capital that may result in 
differential spending on the education of sons and daughters if intertemporal 
considerations are taken into account.  Section 3 introduces the intrahousehold resource 
allocation model to provide a measure of parental forgone consumption used instead on 
children’s education, providing an empirical test of parental investment models.  Section 
4 describes the data and Section 5 presents the empirical findings as to whether gender is 
a significant factor in the allocation of household resources toward the education of 
children in urban China.  In Section 6, we investigate whether any differential spending is 
 
 The model of parental investment in children’s human capital is Discussion Paper No. 15 in the Centre on 
Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance (SKOPE) series at the Universities of Oxford and 
Warwick.  Kind appreciation is also given to the U.K. Department for International Development for 
support.  Any errors are mine. 
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due to better returns to education for men.  If that is not the entire picture, then we turn to 
examine the potential role of intertemporal considerations such as future transfers or 
financial support for parents in urban China.  Finally, we conclude in Section 7 with a 
summary of our findings of gender differences in educational expenditure indicating 
differential investment of parents in their children’s human capital.  We aim to uncover 
whether the oft-perceived tradition of a preference for boys exists in contemporary urban 
China or whether traditions are changing. 
Evidence of pre-labour market gender inequality implies policy 
conclusions that are different from those based on post-entry inequalities in the labour 
market.  This provides a useful analytical separation in examining the factors concerning 
gender discrimination, i.e., differentiating between productivity-related differences 
generated by pre-labour market inequality, such as education obtained as a child, and 
those that pertain once men and women enter the labour market.  Any evidence would 
also point to the circular nature of gender inequality.  In other words, what happens in the 
labour market can affect decisions made prior to entry to the labour market (Rosenzweig 
and Schultz 1982). 
1 Education in Modern China 
 
The modern Chinese educational system is generally comprised of primary 
(six years), secondary (six years, three years of lower and three years of upper middle 
school), and tertiary or higher education (varying between two and five years) (Knight 
and Li 1993).  Education is officially compulsory for nine years to the completion of 
lower middle school, though not always in practice (NBS 1997a).  However, overall 
school enrolment in China is high in 1995, the year corresponding to the data set used in 
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3
this paper.  There are costs involved in schooling that fall into two main categories, 
tuition and fees, and other expenditures, which may include school uniforms, 
transportation expenses, and out-of-school or private tuition fees.  The mean value of 
tuition and fees is 398 RMB in our representative survey, while it is much less (153 
RMB) for other educational expenditures.  In total, these costs are estimated to be less 
than 5% of average household income, so children’s primary and secondary education 
will entail some but not great costs.  There are some differences in school quality as well 
with the better schools expected to be more expensive. 
There are not large gender differences in educational enrolment in urban 
China in the current period (see Knight and Li 1993 for similar findings in 1988).  Figure 
1 presents the possible paths in the Chinese school system and partitions enrolment by 
academic and professional schools into gender proportions, as computed from our data 
set discussed in Section 3.   
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In the Chinese school system, students attend lower middle school after 
completing primary school.  They then test into upper middle school or middle level 
professional school.  Middle level professional school generally takes one more year to 
complete than upper middle school and is typically the last level attained.  Those who 
complete upper middle school are likely to apply and test into college.  Professional 
school is an alternative to college.  Those who select into professional schools will likely 
take on administrative or clerical work, and those who do not continue will likely enter 
the labour force as factory or manufacturing workers.  Those who opt out of school early 
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on are still candidates for factory work in particular, given China’s growth in 
manufacturing capacity. 
Table 1 gives school enrolment rates for children aged 7-18 in our sample.  
The mean years of education for all full-time students is 8.77 with a standard deviation of 
3.83.  For boys, it is 8.86 years of education (with a standard deviation of 3.82), while it 
is 8.66 years of education for girls (with a standard deviation of 3.84).   
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
The gross enrolment ratio of all school-aged children was 94 percent, 
while it was 91 percent for girls and 96 percent for boys (UNESCO 1999).1
[TABLE 2] 
Table 2 shows that the ratio of enrolled girls to boys has stayed the same 
or improved from 1980 to 1995 for every level of education, although girls still lag 
behind at the secondary level and substantially behind at the tertiary level.2 Using a 1995 
rural household survey, Knight and Song (2000) find that boys are significantly more 
likely to be enrolled in school than girls, with the greater difference for upper middle 
school-aged children.  One explanation posited by Broaded and Liu (1996) is that 
educational aspirations are different for boys and girls.  In their study of Wuhan, boys are 
more likely to enter into advanced schooling while girls are more likely to enter into 
professional courses.  They posit that this is primarily the result of two factors – tradition 
and parents’ perception of future discrimination against women.  They also find that 
 
1 UNESCO (1999) uses the definition of school-aged children as given by the country (see NBS 1997b).   
 
2 Figures for rural and urban China separately are not available. 
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women are reluctant to be better educated than any likely future spouse for fear that they 
might risk limiting their marriage prospects.   
This customary reliance on sons and the argument concerning the role of 
tradition in fostering gender inequalities in education may hold for rural China.  In rural 
China, Gao (1994) argues that patrilocal marriage and patrilineal inheritance are 
important aspects of the structure of patriarchal society that did not change in the course 
of economic transformation.3 Even though marriage and inheritance in China are 
legislated to give daughters and sons equal privileges as heirs, patrilineal inheritance 
continues to be practised in rural areas with the result that sons are preferred to daughters 
(Lee 1998).4 Sons inherit property, live near their parents and support them in old age.  In 
a household survey conducted in the early 1990s, the Institute of Population Studies of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (IPS) finds that rural, but not urban, households 
show a preference for sons in the distribution of family property.  We discuss this survey 
 
3 Rural residences, for example, have traditionally been passed to sons and not daughters.  The introduction 
of cooperatives abolished private ownership of land, but it did not significantly affect patrilocal residence 
patterns, argues Gao (1994). The government advocated men moving to their wives’ home at marriage, but 
there are very few instances of this occurrence in rural areas.  China’s rural villages are usually made up of 
several large single-surname lineages.  Because land is limited, villages restrict outsiders from moving in.  
Rural residents see women who move in to marry as effectively of their lineage and their descendants are 
welcomed as part of the lineage.  Men who move in to marry are seen as outside the lineage and are 
excluded because all their descendants will belong to a differently surnamed lineage.  The great majority of 
rural Chinese women must marry or they will not have a home of their own (Gao 1994).  Most do not have 
the privilege of choosing to remain at their natal home because their village is unwilling to distribute land or 
residence to their husbands and children.  In this respect, daughters are unable to benefit their natal families, 
while a son, aside from having his own land, gains another portion when he takes a wife.  The periodic 
redistribution of land contracted for household production under the household responsibility system is 
based on the number of people in the household.  Finally, by remaining near his parents, a son will be able 
to care for them in their old age (Croll 1994).  Consequently, parents in rural China likely value sons more 
than daughters. 
 
4 Lee (1998), in her sociological study of rural-urban migrant factory workers in special economic zones in 
southern China, finds that parents discriminate against girls in favour of boys because of the perception that 
girls will eventually marry and move away so parents must rely on their sons in old age in rural China.  In 
many villages there are only primary schools and upper middle school often involves extra fees for room 
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in detail later in the paper.  Finally, in examining educational enrolment patterns in 1988, 
Knight and Li (1993) find that traditional values favouring the education of boys rather 
than girls appear to have been eroded in urban areas though not in rural areas.   
We will explore whether a preference for boys exists in urban China, or if 
there are other factors motivating the parental decision to educate their children.  To a 
large extent, due to the rural roots and migration patterns of the current cohort of adults in 
urban areas, we expect that rural customs will have an impact on parental attitudes in 
urban China.  This is likely to be compounded by the additional linkages of urban with 
rural China through grandparents and the extended family.  However, we hypothesise that 
parents are rational investors in their children in both rural and urban China, but face 
different constraints.  In other words, there are differences in the economic needs of urban 
and rural households that affect their decisions regarding investment in children.  A 
number of institutional factors in rural China may have caused parents to value sons more 
than daughters, giving rise to a tradition of bias toward boys.  As the view of China is 
often driven by the view of rural areas where the bulk of the population live, there is a 
perception of pro-boy bias.  We posit that tradition is often the historical product of 
practical necessity, and that rational acts under one set of circumstances, such as in rural 
China, will change when the context is altered, as in urban China with a different set of 
household needs and constraints.  Our findings may run counter to the perceived 
traditions within China, but might better reflect the practices of an urban population with 
different concerns.  In other words, traditions could be changing.   
 
and board when attending in towns.  Thus, she finds that parents educate their sons more than their 
daughters with the result that more boys are enrolled in school in some rural areas. 
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Further, in urban China, there is not evidence of two forms of explicit 
gender bias.  Widespread female infanticide has not been documented, perhaps on 
account on the closer monitoring of neighbourhood committees and the work place 
related housing arrangements.  Housing in 1995 was arranged by the work unit, so 
members of a work unit tend also to be neighbours.  Second, unlike in rural China, there 
is no observed popular pattern of arranged marriages, perhaps there is less need to secure 
networks of mutual assistance typically wrought through marriage in agricultural 
societies.  These differences reinforce the notion that gender bias is of a different nature 
in urban China and our investigation of gender bias is consistently conditional on girls 
living in their parents’ households.  Therefore, our study is to discern evidence of gender 
bias as it manifests in educational expenditure and school enrolment of girls in urban 
households. 
Becker (1993) in his book, A Treatise on the Family, identified the 
parental role in developing the human capital of children.  The investment in children’s 
human capital, under credit constraints, necessarily entails forgone current consumption 
for the household.  There is a strand of literature – intrahousehold resource allocation 
models – that could provide an empirical test of the extent to which parents will forgo 
consumption to spend on children’s education through discerning patterns of 
consumption within households (see Deaton 1989; Behrman 1997; Haddad, Hoddinott 
and Alderman 1997 for excellent overviews of this approach).  The degree of 
expectations of returns from children will vary among societies; however, we posit that 
parents invest in their children with an eye toward their own future utility as well as that 
of their offspring.  These intertemporal considerations can generate differential 
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8
investments in the human capital of sons versus daughters that are unrelated to preference 
or bias particular to a society.  We use the intrahousehold resource allocation models to 
investigate educational expenditure in China where there is widely perceived gender bias 
to provide a test of these models by measuring the degree of parental investment in the 
form of forgone consumption. 
2 A Model of Human Capital 
 
Adapting Becker’s three-period model, we introduce a final-period retiree 
who does not earn income and whose utility is comprised of consumption only, which is a 
function of transfers from his children and returns from assets, such as pension schemes.  
The utility function of parents of two children in the tth period is  
Ut = ut + (Wmt+1 + Wft+1 + Ut+1),    (1) 
 
where ut is their utility this period from consumption, Wmt+1 is the future income of their 
son, Wft+1 is the future income of their daughter, Ut+1 is next period’s utility, and  is the 
discount rate or subjective rate of time preference.  The utility derived from their children 
is assumed to be separable from the utility produced by their own consumption.  Utility 
next period, Ut+1, is comprised of consumption in the form of returns from savings 
invested in assets, At+1, and transfers from their son’s future household, Bmt+1, and from 
their daughter’s future household, Bft+1.
The marginal yield on assets, At+1, is Ra, while the marginal yields on 
investments in the human capital of the son and daughter with respect to the returns to 
their future income (Rmh, Rfh) and the portion of that which will generate transfers to 
parents in the next period (Rmb, Rfb) are given by  
Rmh = Wmt+1/mt, Rfh = Wft+1/ft, Rmb = Bmt+1/mt, Rfb = Bft+1/ft, (2) 
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9
where mt and ft denote the proportion of household income, Qt, expended on the human 
capital of their son and daughter, respectively.   
The intertemporal budget constraint is 
 
Zt + mt + ft + At+1/Ra + Bmt+1/Rmb + Bft+1/Rfb = PV(Qt), (3) 
 
where PV(Qt) is the present value of parental household income, comprised of Qt and 
expected Qt+1. In other words, parental household income this period consists of 
proportion of own expenditure (Zt) that include consumption, transfers to their parents, 
savings invested in assets for retirement, and proportion of expenditure that is forgone 
consumption invested in children’s education (mt and ft).  Household resources next 
period (Qt+1) is equal to the discounted value of all expected sources of consumption 
(At+1/Ra + Bmt+1/Rmb + Bft+1/Rfb), i.e., assets and transfers, which are the result of savings 
and investment in children’s human capital.   
An education production function provides that the adult earnings of 
children will be produced by human capital investment by parents and also on account of 
innate ability.  This forms a second set of constraint given by: 
Rmh = R(mt, Hmt) and Rfh = R(ft, Hft), (4) 
where a son’s income, Rmh, will be determined by expenditure on education by his parents 
(mt) and his ability (Hmt), and similarly for a daughter. 
The allocation between investing in assets or children when contemplating 
consumption next period is determined by a first order condition equating the marginal 
yields on the three sources of income in the third period:   
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A’t+1 + Bm’t+1 + Bf’t+1 = u/Rk = U’t+1, (5a) 
where u is the marginal utility of income.  The yields on human capital are expected to 
decline as more resources are invested, Rmh/mt < 0, Rfh/ft < 0, Rmb/mt < 0, and 
Rfb/ft < 0, Rmh/Hmt < 0, Rfh/Hft < 0, and will eventually equal returns to assets in 
this model including ability,5 Ra assumed to be constant.  Since Rmh/Ra < 0, Rfh/Ra <
0, Rmh > Ra and Rfh > Ra, the marginal rate of return is denoted Rk.
The next first order condition maximises parental utility and determines 
their optimal consumption in periods two and three: 
U’t = RkU’t+1 = u. (5b) 
 
The last first order condition determines investment in children’s human 
capital in terms of the utility derived from the future income of the children: 
RmhWm’t+1 = u, RfhWf’t+1 = u. (5c) 
 
Combining the first order conditions gives  
 
u/Ra = u/Rmb = u/Rfb = u/Rmh = u/Rfh, (6) 
 
which shows that the marginal rates of return on human capital for both the children’s 
future income and expected transfers equal the return on assets in both periods.  
Differential spending on sons and daughters can thus be efficient rather than solely a 
result of bias of altruism.   
The decision to invest in children’s human capital in this and other models 
in the Becker tradition will entail forgone consumption by parents spent instead on the 
 
5 The support for this premise is well established and can be found in Becker (1993) whereby investment in 
ability for children will generate more investment in the more able of the children until the marginal rates of 
return to the investment is equal for all children. 
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education of children.  There is a strand of empirical literature termed models of 
intrahousehold resource allocation which we propose would provide a direct test of such 
forgone consumption.  These models reveal the decision of parents in a household to 
spend on children’s education versus own consumption, consistent with the parental 
investment model as outlined above.  In so doing, any evidence of differential 
expenditure on the education of sons and daughters can also be discerned.  These models 
can be extended to investigate wealth or endowment effects as in Behrman et al. (1995) 
and for credit constraints, although we do not currently have data to so.  Credit constraints 
certainly exist in China in 1995, a period prior to commercial credit liberalisation 
(Naughton 1996), and is so inferred in interpreting our results. Given these limitations, 
we posit that the intrahousehold resource allocation models provide one type of empirical 
evidence that can provide one measure the extent of forgone consumption by parents, 
albeit imperfectly.  At a minimum, they allow for inferences of patterns of gender bias 
among children for a given household’s resource allocation decisions, for which these 
models have been widely used in investigating patterns of consumption in developing 
countries (see Doss 1996 for an overview). 
The next section outlines the empirical testing we will undertake and how 
the intrahousehold resource allocation models can be utilised to test parents’ forgone 
consumption used instead on children’s education, consistent with the theoretical models 
which posit that such decisions are taken when parents who decide to invest in children’s 
education. 
3 Differences in Household Expenditure Patterns on Children’s Education 
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Intrahousehold resource allocation models seek to disaggregate household 
expenditure and can determine whether composition of a household affect spending 
decisions (see Deaton 1997).  Studies of developing countries suggest the importance of 
the age-gender composition of the household in resource allocation decisions.  They tend 
to find that expenditure patterns favour males (see Deaton 1997).  Medical care for girls 
is a luxury good in that it is more income and price elastic than for boys in Pakistan 
(Alderman and Gertler 1997).  Regarding children’s education, DeTray (1988) finds in 
Malaysia that the demand for girls’ schooling is more income elastic than for boys.  
Similarly, the education of girls is a luxury good in Vietnam (Behrman and Knowles 
1999).   
Household expenditures are also thought to differ with the degree of 
influence of women, suggesting a joint decision-making model (see Haddad, Hoddinott 
and Alderman 1997).  For instance, Hoddinott and Haddad (1994) find in the Côte 
d’Ivoire in the 1980s that doubling the cash income of women increases the household 
budget share of food and reduces the shares of alcohol and cigarettes. Haddad and 
Hoddinott (1994) also find in the Côte d’Ivoire that increasing women’s share of cash 
income betters the health status of boys relative to girls.  For Brazil, Thomas and Strauss 
(1997) find that increased female earnings are associated with a larger share of the 
household budget being devoted in human capital – such as health and education – as 
well as leisure goods, including recreation.  Song (2001), in a study of rural China in 
1995, finds that greater female bargaining power changes expenditure patterns in favour 
of health care and education, but does not reduce the pro-boy discrimination in these 
expenditures (for an overview of bargaining theories, see Lundberg and Pollack 1996).   
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We use this approach to measure the decision of parents to forgo 
consumption to spend on education as a measure of direct investment in children’s human 
capital and also investigating any gender differences posited in the theoretical model.  We 
propose that this is a useful direct test of this genre of parental investment models where 
parents decide to give up current consumption in order to spend on their children’s human 
capital.   
In line with this literature, both a unitary household decision-making 
model and a joint decision-making model will be estimated to determine the best fit (see 
Deaton 1997 for the theoretical underpinnings and restrictions of these models).   
3.1 Unitary Household Decision-making Model 
Derived from the specifications of the theoretical model, we transform the 
variables into the specifications of this set of empirical models found in Deaton (1997).  
The proportion of household expenditure on the share of household expenditure on 
children’s education is given by 
G-1  
et = 0 + 1ln[(Zt+et)/n) + 2ln(n) + 3(ng/n) + 4Xt + t, (7) 
 g=1 
 
where et denotes the share of household expenditures spent on the education of children, 
Zt+et is total household monetary expenditure, n denotes household size, ng is the number 
of individuals of age-gender demographic group g, ng/n represents the proportion of 
individuals of demographic group g in the household, Xt is a vector of control variables, 
and t is the error term.    
3.2 Joint Household Decision-making Model 
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An alternative formulation takes into account potential bargaining as 
between parents concerning the education of their children.  A proxy for relative 
bargaining power is included.  The equation is now given by 
G-1  
et = 0 + 1ln[(Zt+et)/n) + 2ln(n) + 3(ng/n) + 4Xt + 5Emt + t, (8) 
 g=1 
 
where Emt denotes the years of education of the mother as a ratio of the total years of 
education of both spouses, which is a proxy for female bargaining power.  We tried 
alternative proxies, such as women’s share of earned income to that of both spouses (see 
the proxies used by Hoddinott and Haddad 1994 for the Côte d’Ivoire and Song 2001 for 
rural China). 
3.3 Interpreting Patterns of Intrahousehold Resource Allocation 
 
As explained by Deaton (1989, 1997), because we do not have data 
regarding actual expenditure on the education of boys and girls but only on all the 
children in the household, the analysis is based on a correlation between the number of 
boys and girls in the household and the amount of forgone consumption.  This is 
evidenced through the variable, ng/n. From both the unitary and the joint decision-
making formulations of the model, the coefficient 3 indicates the relationship between 
educational expenditure and the age-composition of the household.  If 3 are significant 
and different for boys and girls, then there is evidence of differential investment in 
children’s human capital as seen through forgone consumption of parents.  Again, this is 
a direct test of parents forgoing consumption to spend on children’s education as well as a 
method to discern whether such forgone consumption and expenditure differ by gender.   
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4 Data 
We tested our hypotheses using an unusually comprehensive and 
representative urban household survey conducted in China and related to 1995.  The 
survey has rich data on consumption and income for each household.  The survey was 
designed by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in 
consultation with international scholars.  The households are drawn from a sub-sample of 
the NBS annual household income and expenditure survey.  Eleven of the 30 provinces of 
China are included. For details, see Riskin, Zhao and Li (2001).   
The pertinent descriptives are as follows.  There are 6,594 households and 
21,697 individuals, of whom 70.3 percent are aged 19 and over, and primary and 
secondary school-aged children (7-18 years of age) are approximately 17.12 percent.  Of 
such children, boys are slightly more numerous than girls (8.61 percent and 8.51 percent, 
respectively), and the gender ratio of girls to boys is 98.84.  In terms of age-gender 
demographics, boys aged 7-12 are 3.82 percent of household members, boys aged 13-15 
are 2.70 percent, boys aged 16-18 are 2.09 percent, while girls aged 7-12 are 4.02 percent, 
girls aged 13-15 are 2.37 percent and girls aged 16-18 are 2.12 percent.   
The mean proportion of annual household resources expended on 
children’s education is 4.69 percent (with a standard deviation of 0.09).  In absolute 
figures, it is 573 yuan or RMB (with a standard deviation of 1,219).  Total mean 
household expenditure is 12,222 yuan (with a standard deviation of 10,365), while mean 
household income is 14,290 yuan (with a standard deviation of 8,591).  As expected 
under the one-child policy, the mean number of household members is 3.13 (with a 
standard deviation of 0.83).  More than three-quarters of the households are two-
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generations (78.16 percent), while one-generation households comprise 15.52 percent, 
three-generation households are 5.55 percent, and the remaining 7.65 percent are other 
types of household, defined as those with relatives other than the nuclear family or 
includes non-relatives.  The head of household is male in a majority of the sample (65.93 
percent), and just under half of all households (45.64 percent) include a Communist Party 
member. 
5 Empirical Findings 
We first examine whether there are gender differences in parents’ 
expenditures on children’s education.  The results of the two-stage least squares 
estimation of a unitary household decision-making model of resource allocation toward 
children’s education are presented in Table 3.  The independent variables include 
household level variables as well as the characteristics of the household head in addition 
to city dummy variables.  The education variable is a rank variable indicating the level of 
education completed, while the occupation variable is also a rank variable indicating 
professional to unskilled workers.  We tested the robustness of the specification by using 
one-generation households as the omitted variable, for instance.  Different characteristics 
of the household head were also tried.  Our results concerning the significance of the age-
gender household composition variables do not change. 
Given the nature of household consumption studies, there are variables 
which could be endogenous to the system.  Accordingly, potentially endogenous variables 
were tested according to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Greene, 1997).  Instruments were 
selected according to the criteria specified in Bound et al. (1995).  Ownership of 
telephone proxied the standard of living of the household and household type ranging 
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from flats to houses validly instrumented household expenditure per capita and the 
number of people in the household, respectively.  A detailed discussion of the instruments 
and endogenous variables can be found in the Appendix.  The 2SLS estimation is 
properly identified according to the Sargan test, the instruments were jointly significant at 
the 1 percent level and the partial R-squared of the first stage regression is of reasonable 
magnitude.  On account of the rich detail in this data set, we were thus able to instrument 
for the endogenous variables to a good level.  Further details of the first stage regressions 
are provided in the Appendix.   
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Not surprising, there is a 4.98 percentage point increase in the proportion 
of household resources allocated to children’s education associated with two-generation 
households.  Turning to the age-gender household composition variables,6 we find that 
the proportions of boys and girls aged 13-15 and 16-18 affect the proportion of household 
resources expended on children’s education, but not children aged 7-12.  As education is 
 
6 Other significant variables include the education of the household head and the proportion of men aged 
56-65 in the household, along with a number of province dummy variables.  The education of the household 
head and the proportion of men aged 56-65 both have negative effects on children’s educational 
expenditures.  There are numerous possible explanations.  Regarding the education of the household head, 
as expenditure is a proportion of household income if better educated household heads earn more income 
then education fees form a smaller part of total household income.  It is also possible that we have only 
captured direct expenditure on children’s education and not indirect spending.  In other words, parents will 
invest a set amount of time and resources in their children.  More educated household heads may spend 
more time investing in their children by helping them with homework or perhaps spend time and resources 
on cultivating social networks to further the children’s future opportunities.  Less educated household heads 
may not be able to invest in these other respects and thus their spending is direct, while indirect 
expenditures and time spent are not captured in this estimation.  Other factors could also include providing 
health and support for their children, which could be reflected in parental time and their own forgone 
consumption.  The proportion of men aged 56-65 in the household probably include retirees who are not 
now earning income but may require additional expenditure on their consumption that will take away from 
spending on children’s education.  This corresponds to other studies in which adult men in the household 
are associated with an increase in spending on alcohol and cigarettes and a decrease in spending on 
education and health (for example, see Hoddinott and Haddad 1995).  Finally, as compared with the omitted 
province of Jiangsu, poorer provinces such as Liaoning, Anhui, Henan and Yunnan have significantly 
negative coefficients.   
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heavily subsidised, this is not surprising for the younger age groups (see Knight and Li 
1996).  The proportion of boys aged 13-15 increases household expenditure on children’s 
education by 14.65 percentage points, while girls aged 13-15 increase expenditure by a 
smaller amount (13.17 percentage points).7 The situation is reversed for boys and girls 
aged 16-18, in which the effects on household educational expenditure are respectively 
14.34 percentage points and 19.98 percentage points.  The results of this model suggest 
that there are differential patterns of household expenditure on the education of boys and 
girls that are significant for middle school children (ages 13-15 best correspond to lower 
secondary school while ages 16-18 best correspond to upper secondary school).  
Household expenditure patterns appear to favour boys aged 13-15, but girls aged 16-18.   
We next include proxies for bargaining power as between spouses to 
determine whether the unitary household decision-making model is the proper 
specification.  None of the proxies for spousal bargaining power is found to be significant 
(see also IPS 19948).  One set of estimations is reported in Table 4.  
[TABLE 4] 
The results in Table 4 correspond to the unitary household decision-
making model (Table 3) in that girls aged 13-15 are associated with a smaller proportion 
of household educational expenditure than boys of the same age cohort, while girls aged 
16-18 receive more expenditure on their education than boys of the same ages.  
Specifically, the proportion of girls aged 13-15 in the household increases expenditure by 
 
7 Joint F-tests on all of these sets of coefficients reject the null hypothesis that they are equal for boys and 
girls of the same age groups. 
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13.14 percentage points, while boys of the same ages increase expenditure by 14.65 
percentage points.  The proportion of boys aged 16-18 increases household expenditure 
on education by 14.33 percentage points, while girls aged 16-18 increases household 
expenditure by 19.98 percentage points.  Joint F-tests on these sets of coefficients reject 
the null hypothesis that they are equal for boys and girls of the same age groups.  These 
findings provide further support that the household spends more on daughters in upper 
secondary school and sons in lower middle school. 
5.1   Accounting for school quality 
We attempted to isolate the effects of school quality by disaggregating 
educational expenditures to the extent permitted by our data.  Expenditures on children’s 
education comprise two items – expenditures on tuition and fees, and other expenditures.  
Tuition and fees serve as our best proxy for school quality, as we do not have data on 
actual schools in the survey.  By separating the two categories, we may find that the 
differences are a function of school quality insofar as better schools are more costly.  The 
mean value of tuition and fees is 398.80 RMB (with a standard deviation of 1027.85) 
while it is 153.87 RMB (with a standard deviation of 683.89) for other educational 
expenditures.  We cannot identify these other expenditures, but posit that they include 
school uniforms, transportation expenses and out-of-school tuition fees.  None of the 
coefficients on the age-gender household composition terms were significant and the link 
with school quality is not clear cut. 
5.2   Implications of the one-child policy 
 
8 The survey conducted by IPS (1994) finds little difference in responses regarding household expenditure 
when spousal bargaining power is taken into account.  The several measures of bargaining power include 
spouses’ age difference, educational levels and proportion of earned income. 
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We also explore the implications of the one-child policy implemented in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s on household expenditure on children’s education, i.e.,
families with one child will spend on their child regardless of his or her gender.  The 
cohort of school-aged children in 1995 is affected by this policy.  Table 5 gives the mean 
values for household expenditure on children’s education for single-child, single-boy and 
single-girl households, as compared with all households with children that include single-
child households. 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
Single-child households represent 60.3 percent of all households with 
children in the sample.  Of these households, 51.6 percent are single-boy households and 
the remainder are single-girl households.  Single-child households spend 2.55 percent 
more on children’s education than all households with children.  Single-girl households 
spend more, on average, on children’s education in both sub-categories than single-boy 
households.  These figures suggest that parents are willing to spend more on education 
where there is one child, and also that there may be more associated expenses for girls 
than boys in single-child households, such as clothing, that are captured in the other 
expenditure category.  One possible explanation as to why tuition and school fees are also 
higher for single-girl households may have to do with girls testing into better schools with 
higher fees.  However, our discussion above indicates that our data set does not permit us 
to explore school quality.  Given these patterns, nevertheless, we may find that the larger 
educational expenditure associated with the proportion of girls aged 16-18 is explained by 
single-girl households.  Table 6 gives the results of the intrahousehold resource allocation 
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model of expenditure on children’s education estimated for the sub-sample of single-child 
households, and further disaggregated by single-boy and single-girl households.  
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
The results of Table 6 do not shed further light on the degree to which the 
age-gender composition of the household affects expenditure on children’s education.  
Although single-child households are a majority of the sample of households with 
children, the age-gender composition variables are not significant in these estimations.  
Therefore, the patterns f household expenditure on children’s education are not well 
explained by single-child households.  In sum, we find that the proportion of household 
expenditure on the education of children significantly differs for children aged 13-15 and 
16-18, corresponding to the two levels of secondary school.   
5.3   Academic versus professional schools 
Table 7 shows there are more girls enrolled in middle level professional 
school than boys, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total aged 16-18.9
The reverse is true for upper middle school in which there are fewer girls than boys – 
again both absolutely and as a percentage of total enrolment.  It is possible that girls self-
select into professional rather than academic upper secondary school.  The testing process 
into upper middle school is another possibility.  However, it is difficult to distinguish 
ability from the influence of examination preparation at lower middle school that may 
result from more household expenditure on the education of boys aged 13-15.   
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
9 There are 499 boys aged 16-18, making the gender ratio 1.03 for this cohort. 
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Our original estimation of the intrahousehold resource allocation model 
did not separate children according to whether they attended academic or professional 
schools.  To test for possible differences stemming from the type of school, we re-
estimate the household expenditure model.10 The results are given in Table 8.   
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
As expected, children who are not enrolled in school do not affect the 
pattern of household expenditure on education (Table 8).  A larger proportion of 
household resources is spent on girls aged 16-18 regardless of the type of school (middle 
level professional school or upper middle school) than on boys of the same age-group and 
enrolled in the same schools (all coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level).11 Joint 
F-tests on these sets of coefficients reject the null hypothesis that they are equal for boys 
and girls of the same age groups.  We find that the coefficients for each set of boys and 
girls of the same age groups are statistically different.  These results confirm the results of 
our original estimation in which academic and professional schools are considered 
together.   
Therefore, our findings reveal that there is more spending on boys aged 
13-15 but more on girls aged 16-18, suggesting that standard human capital theories and 
 
10 The estimated model is of the unitary household decision-making form since we did not find evidence to 
support a bargaining model. 
 
11 In order not to omit observations, we include those children aged 16-18 enrolled in college and in 
professional school.  There are 11 men enrolled in college and above and another 11 in professional school.  
There are 12 women enrolled in college and above and 19 in professional school.  Despite their small 
numbers, the coefficients on educational expenditure on sons and daughters who are enrolled in college are 
positive and significant (at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively).  The coefficient for girls in 
college is almost twice as large than that of boys.  For those attending professional school, we find that the 
coefficient on girls is positive and significant (at the 1 percent level), but not significant for boys.  This 
lends additional evidence that more is spent on girls than boys aged 16-18 regardless of the type of school. 
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traditional perceptions of gender bias do not completely explain the educational 
expenditure decision.  We next turn to examine whether these findings are consistent with 
models which consider parents’ intertemporal preferences.   
6 Returns to Parental Investment 
 
Standard human capital theory would suggest that the current educational 
attainment of the adult population and their earnings affect the current expenditure on 
education and enrolment of children?  Table 9 and Figure 2 depict the educational 
attainment of the adult population, divided into working-aged men and women (19-55) 
and those aged 56 and over.   
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Using the earnings data in the survey, we predict mean annual income for 
men and women with each level of educational attainment standardising for the 
characteristics of their respective samples (see the Appendix for the earnings functions).  
These findings are consistent with studies of returns to education in China and in 
particular with the results of other researchers using this data set specifically to 
investigate returns to education (e.g., Knight and Li 1996). Predicted mean annual 
income is higher for sons than daughters with the average characteristics of the sample for 
all educational levels (Table 10).   
[TABLE 10] 
We conclude that parents spend more on the education of sons than 
daughters who are aged 13-15 on account of men receiving higher rates of return to 
education.  However, parents spend more on daughters than sons aged 16-18 in both types 
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of upper secondary school.  The evidence suggests that higher rates of return to education 
cannot be the motivation in the latter case because men earn higher returns than women in 
upper middle school.  Of the possible explanations, it is also plausible that there are 
different kinds of families in the sample.  The parents who spend more on daughters aged 
16-18 may have also spent more on daughters at the time when they were aged 13-15 than 
on sons of the same age groups.  However, we are unable to test this outcome without 
data for the same families from previous years.  We turn to another possible explanation 
which is that there are future transfers to consider when parents make investment 
decisions that are based not just on the standard returns to education for the child but on 
his or her future expected household income.  Because we do not have two generations of 
data on transfers to parents, we will estimate expected future transfers to parents based on 
assessing children’s future household income, which is consistent with the theories of 
parental investment when parents look ahead to expected returns in making current 
investment decisions.  
To obtain the expected household income of a child, we need to 
incorporate theories of assortative mating to predict the likely income of a child’s future 
potential spouse.  The predicted annual mean income of the children’s likely future 
spouse is the predicted annual mean income of men and women weighted by the 
probabilities of marrying a spouse who has attained each educational level based on Table 
11.   
[TABLE 11] 
Table 11 shows that 82.3 percent of women of each level of educational 
attainment marry at or above their own educational level, while it is less (55.5 percent) 
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for men.  In the absence of perfect assortative mating, parents have only a probabilistic 
expectation that a child will marry a spouse with comparable education based on the 
distribution of the educational attainment of spouses in the current cohort of married 
couples.  In other words, a woman with educational attainment at or above the college 
level has a 60.47 percent chance of marrying a man who has attained the same level of 
education, a 15.28 percent chance of marrying a man with a professional school 
education, a 7.31 percent chance of marrying a man of middle level professional school 
educational attainment, a 7.64 percent chance of marrying a man who has completed 
upper middle school, a 3.65 percent chance of marrying a man who has completed lower 
middle school, a 0.66 percent chance of marrying a man with a primary school education 
and probability of naught of marrying a man with less than primary school education.  
These weights are multiplied by the respective predicted annual mean income of men 
who have completed each level of education. If there were perfect assortative mating, 
then column (1) would equal column (4) and columns (2) and (3) would be equal in Table 
12.  The combined income of the child and that of their likely future spouse’s generates 
an expectation of the child’s future household income from which parents may obtain 
transfers, shown in Table 12. 
[TABLE 12 HERE] 
Table 13 gives the predicted mean annual income for the future 
households of daughters and sons based on their respective expected mean income and 
that of their likely spouse [column (1) in Table 13 is the sum of columns (1) and (4) in 
Table 12, while column (2) in Table 13 is the sum of columns (2) and (3) in Table 12].  
Expected mean annual household income is higher for daughters than sons for each level 
Page 27 of 114
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
26
of educational attainment.  These are static expectations and may not accurately reflect 
the rapid economic changes taking place in China in 1995.  However, to the extent that 
parents act on available information, this exercise is useful in attempting to gain an 
understanding of parental expectations of future transfers.   
[TABLE 13 HERE] 
We find that the smallest difference between the expected future 
household income of sons and daughters is for those who have completed lower middle 
school, while the largest difference is for those who have completed middle level 
professional school.  This coincides with our finding that parents invest more in sons than 
daughters aged 13-15 (corresponding to lower middle school) but more in daughters than 
sons aged 16-18 (corresponding to upper secondary school).   
Finally, by law children have an obligation to support their parents.12 In 
addition, approximately 80 percent of all persons are employed in the state sector in urban 
China that provides pensions.13 This may reduce some of the tendency to favour sons 
over daughters that arises in rural China, which lacks pension schemes and has a greater 
adherence to traditional preferences for boys discussed earlier.  When also considered in 
light of the large number of families with one child, there may also be a diminished 
expectation of relying on sons in old age.  This could reinforce the interpretation that 
there intertemporal concerns are strong, and there are indeed future transfers to consider.  
 
12 See The Protection of the Rights and Interests of Old People Law (October 1, 1996), particularly Article 
11: “Children and their spouses are both to support their parents both financially, spiritually and of their 
particular needs.”  There is a counterpart in the criminal law providing for sanctions. 
 
13 Of the 15,233 employed individuals, the workplace is SOEs for 12,157 persons. 
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These explanations are also consistent with a degree of altruism in China, heightened by 
the one-child policy, which suggests changing traditions in urban areas. 
7 Conclusion 
 
This paper used a strand of models – intrahousehold resource allocation 
approach – to test the extent to which parents forgo current consumption to invest in their 
children’s human capital.  Utilising these models, we were able to measure parental 
expenditure on children’s education rather than own consumption, providing a test of 
parental investment models for urban China. 
Our findings were that the proportion of household resources allocated to 
children’s education in urban China in 1995 is not well explained by examining only 
returns to education or a preference for boys.  If a bias for sons were the governing 
motivation, then we would not expect to find more expenditure on the education of 
daughters aged 16-18.  Rather, the evidence suggests otherwise.   
Insofar as expenditures on children’s education entail forgone 
consumption, parents are likely to be efficient as well as altruistic in their decisions.  This 
is reinforced by specific intertemporal considerations found in China, such as the 
expectation that parents in retirement will depend on transfers from children, as well as 
on assets, for consumption in an imperfect credit market and pensions system.  Moreover, 
the circular nature of perceived future labour market discrimination will affect the 
investment decision in counteracting ways.   
Future labour market discrimination will cause investment to differ for 
sons and daughters.  Given perceived gender earnings differentials, parents will invest 
more in the human capital of sons, in accordance with standard returns to education 
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analyses.  A second consideration in our adapted model is expected transfers.  Favourable 
assortative mating will generate higher returns from investments in daughters than in 
sons.  This is owing to the same gender earning differentials that will cause daughters to 
marry spouses with higher returns to human capital and augment their future household 
income more than for sons.  We thus expect that parents will invest more in the human 
capital of daughters.  These two effects are endogenous and co-exist.  For urban China, 
we find evidence consistent with these two effects.  With some limitations to the 
interpretation of the results, the empirical data calibrating household consumption 
provides some evidence of the human capital models. 
In conclusion, there are some – but not large – gender differences in the 
educational enrolment of school-aged children in urban China.  Despite more expenditure 
on the education of girls than boys aged 16-18, there is evidence that girls have higher 
attrition rates beyond lower middle school, are more likely to be enrolled in professional 
than academic schools, and expect lower returns to this education than boys.  Therefore, 
we find gender differences in urban China are the likely result of perceived earnings 
inequality that may in turn cause these children to receive unequal investment in their 
human capital prior to entering the labour market.  
[APPENDIX TABLES A1-3 HERE] 
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Table 1 
School Enrolment Rates (%) for Children Aged 7-18 
(total number of boys and girls) 
Age Boys Girls 
7 87.5 
(144) 
89.4 
(142) 
8 97.2 
(145) 
95.3 
(150) 
9 99.1 
(111) 
99.3 
(140) 
10 96.1 
(153) 
96.2 
(133) 
11 98.5 
(137) 
96.3 
(136) 
12 97.0 
(168) 
96.8 
(189) 
13 99.5 
(199) 
99.0 
(193) 
14 98.1 
(206) 
95.8 
(166) 
15 98.0 
(198) 
97.8 
(181) 
16 93.8 
(160) 
94.4 
(196) 
17 91.5 
(176) 
90.1 
(152) 
18 84.0 
(163) 
75.0 
(164) 
Total Enrolment Rate 94.6 
(1960) 
93.9 
(1942) 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 2 
Gross Enrolment Ratios of Girls in Selected Years 
(gender ratio of girls to boys) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
All School-Aged Children 71 
(0.81) 
70 
(0.82) 
79 
(0.87) 
91 
(0.95) 
Primary 104 
(0.86) 
114 
(0.86) 
120 
(0.93) 
117 
(0.99) 
Secondary 37 
(0.69) 
33 
(0.70) 
42 
(0.75) 
62 
(0.89) 
Tertiary 0.8 
(0.32) 
1.7 
(0.44) 
2.0 
(0.51) 
3.9 
(0.53) 
Sources:  NBS (1997b), UNESCO (1999) and World Bank (2000a, 2000b). 
Notes:   (1) The data on net enrolment ratios (NER), which would compute the ratio of the number of  
children of official school age enrolled in school to the number of children school age in the 
population, is not available for secondary and tertiary education nor is it complete for primary 
school in China (UNESCO 1999).  We report gross enrolment ratios (GER), defined as the total 
enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the 
official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given school 
year (UNESCO 1999).  As noted earlier, the GER is widely used as an alternative indicator to 
the NER when data on enrolment by single years of age are not available.  NER for primary 
education is reported in Note (2) to this table. 
(2) For primary education, NER for girls was 89 and the gender ratio was 0.92 in 1986, as  
figures for 1985 were not available.  In 1990, NER for girls was 95 and the gender ratio was 
0.96.  In 1995, NER for girls was 98 and the gender ratio was 1.00. 
 (3) For tertiary education, the figures are for 1996, as 1995 figures were not available. 
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Table 3 
Two Stage Least Squares Unitary Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Model  
Regarding the Proportion of Household Expenditure on Children’s Education 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of  
Household Resources Expended on Children’s Education 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept -0.0776 
(-0.374) 
 0.046914 
(0.0898) 
Household Characteristics:
Log of household expenditure per capita (predicted) -0.0088 
(-1.119) 
 8.137015 
(0.3157) 
Log of number of household members (predicted)16 0.1366 
(1.119) 
 1.106217 
(0.2016) 
Communist Party membership of any member of the 
household 
0.0051 
(1.135) 
0.4564 
(0.4981) 
One-generation household 0.1186 
(1.291) 
0.1552 
(0.0871) 
Two-generation household 0.0498 
 (1.706)* 
0.7816 
(0.3622) 
Three-generation household 0.0052 
(0.377) 
0.0555 
(0.2291) 
Characteristics of Household Head:
Male -0.0072 
(-1.548) 
0.6593 
(0.4740) 
Educational level -0.0033 
 (-3.373)*** 
3.8015 
(1.5173) 
Occupation -0.0012 
(-1.631) 
5.5657 
(1.9401) 
Age-Gender Composition of Household:
Male aged 0-6 -0.0096 
(-0.233) 
0.0256 
(0.0862) 
Male aged 7-12 0.0583 
(1.349) 
0.0382 
(0.1046) 
Male aged 13-15 0.1465 
 (3.719)*** 
0.0270 
(0.0894) 
Male aged 16-18 0.1434 
 (6.180)*** 
0.0209 
(0.0785) 
Male aged 19-55 -0.0027 
(-0.147) 
0.2893 
(0.1711) 
Male aged 56-65 -0.0440 
 (-2.061)** 
0.0653 
(0.1503) 
Male aged 66 and over -0.0404 
(-1.398) 
0.0299 
(0.1101) 
 
14 Mean value and standard deviation of the dependent variable are reported, and similarly in each table in 
the paper. 
 
15 The mean of the natural logarithm of household expenditure per capita (actual) is 8.1366 with a standard 
deviation of 0.7323. 
 
16 We use the logarithm of number of household members to better correspond with the proportion of 
household expenditure and age-gender composition variables (see also Song 1999). 
 
17 The mean of log of number of household members (actual) is 1.1063 with a standard deviation of 0.2682. 
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Female aged 0-6 -0.0191 
(-0.466) 
0.0235 
(0.0831) 
Female aged 7-12 0.0636 
(1.418) 
0.0402 
(0.1071) 
Female aged 13-15 0.1317 
 (3.852)*** 
0.0237 
(0.0844) 
Female aged 16-18 0.1998 
 (9.348)*** 
0.0212 
(0.0780) 
Female aged 19-55 0.0136 
(0.589) 
0.3094 
(0.1634) 
Female aged 56-65 0.0052 
(0.168) 
0.0593 
(0.1492) 
Provinces:
Beijing -0.00004 
(-0.007) 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Shanxi -0.0106 
(-1.324) 
0.0937 
(0.2915) 
Liaoning -0.0207 
 (-4.242)*** 
0.1010 
(0.3013) 
Anhui -0.0095 
 (-1.695)* 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Henan -0.0265 
 (-3.465)*** 
0.0865 
(0.2812) 
Hubei 0.0018 
(0.391) 
0.1070 
(0.3091) 
Guangdong -0.0070 
(-0.875) 
0.0787 
(0.2694) 
Sichuan -0.0049 
(-1.261) 
0.1223 
(0.3277) 
Yunnan -0.0100 
 (-2.021)** 
0.0935 
(0.2911) 
Gansu -0.0040 
(-0.616) 
0.0577 
(0.2331) 
 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(32, 6555) 
Number of observations 
 
0.0905 
0.0861 
 26.17*** 
6588 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any  
 Communist Party members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types  
 of households. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Instruments are ownership of telephone and type of house; see Appendix for first stage 
regression results. 
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Table 4 
Two Stage Least Squares Joint Household Decision-making Model  
Regarding the Proportion of Household Expenditure on Children’s Education 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Household 
Resources Expended on Children’s Education 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept -0.0794 
(-0.407) 
0.0551 
(0.0899) 
Household Characteristics:
Log of household expenditure per capita (predicted) -0.0088 
 (-1.118) 
8.1370 
(0.3157) 
Log of number of household members (predicted) 0.1369 
(1.145) 
1.1062 
(0.2016) 
Communist Party membership of any member of the 
household 
0.0051 
(0.0045) 
0.4564 
(0.4981) 
One-generation household 0.1187 
(1.313) 
0.1552 
(0.0871) 
Two-generation household 0.0499 
 (1.718)* 
0.7816 
(0.3622) 
Three-generation household 0.0052 
(0.378) 
0.0555 
(0.2291) 
Characteristics of Household Head:
Male -0.0065 
(-0.611) 
0.6593 
(0.4740) 
Educational level -0.0033 
 (-3.366)*** 
3.8015 
(1.5173) 
Occupation -0.0012 
(-1.641) 
5.5657 
(1.9401) 
Age-Gender Composition of Household:
Male aged 0-6 -0.0096 
(-0.232) 
0.0256 
(0.0862) 
Male aged 7-12 0.0583 
(1.340) 
0.0382 
(0.1046) 
Male aged 13-15 0.1465 
 (3.714)*** 
0.0270 
(0.0894) 
Male aged 16-18 0.1433 
 (6.120)*** 
0.0209 
(0.0785) 
Male aged 19-55 -0.0026 
(-0.145) 
0.2893 
(0.1711) 
Male aged 56-65 -0.0437 
 (-2.146)** 
0.0653 
(0.1503) 
Male aged 66 and over -0.0400 
(-1.466) 
0.0299 
(0.1101) 
Female aged 0-6 -0.0191 
(-0.464) 
0.0235 
(0.0831) 
Female aged 7-12 0.0636 
(1.407) 
0.0402 
(0.1071) 
Female aged 13-15 0.1314 
 (3.847)*** 
0.0237 
(0.0844) 
Female aged 16-18 0.1998 
 (9.305)*** 
0.0212 
(0.0780) 
Female aged 19-55 0.0135 
(0.565) 
0.3094 
(0.1634) 
Female aged 56-65 0.0051 
(0.162) 
0.0593 
(0.1492) 
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Provinces:
Beijing -0.0001 
(-0.009) 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Shanxi -0.0106 
(-1.338) 
0.0937 
(0.2915) 
Liaoning -0.0207 
 (-4.269)*** 
0.1010 
(0.3013) 
Anhui -0.0096 
 (-1.691)* 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Henan -0.0265 
 (-3.489)*** 
0.0865 
(0.2812) 
Hubei 0.0018 
(0.389) 
0.1070 
(0.3091) 
Guangdong -0.0070 
(-0.877) 
0.0787 
(0.2694) 
Sichuan -0.0062 
(-1.256) 
0.1223 
(0.3277) 
Yunnan -0.0100 
 (-2.023)** 
0.0935 
(0.2911) 
Gansu -0.0040 
(-0.615) 
0.0577 
(0.2331) 
Proxy for Bargaining Power:
Wife’s years of education as a proportion of the 
husband’s and wife’s combined years of education 
0.0014 
(0.106) 
0.6259 
(0.2997) 
 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(33, 6554) 
Number of observations 
 
0.0903 
0.0857 
 25.45*** 
6588 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist Party  
 members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Instruments are ownership of telephone and type of house; see Appendix for first stage 
regression results. 
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Table 5 
Mean Household Expenditure on Children’s Education for All and Single-Child Households 
(in yuan with standard deviation and maximums, respectively, in parentheses) 
Children’s Educational 
Expenditure 
All Households 
with Children 
Single-Child 
Households 
Single-Boy 
Households 
Single-Girl 
Households 
Number of Households 5802 4181 2158 2023 
Total Educational 
Expenditure 
602.11 
(1278.74; 33,033) 
617.85 
(1177.98; 33,033) 
610.46 
(1244.29; 33,033) 
625.75 
(1103.12; 12,683) 
Sub-category: Tuition 
and School Fees 
411.28 
(1063.94; 40,000) 
409.61 
(1092.57; 40,000) 
404.25 
(1168.71; 40,000) 
415.32 
(1005.28; 17,010) 
Sub-category: Other 
Expenditures 
161.77 
(709.31; 25,000) 
158.86 
(636.62; 17,400) 
151.03 
(517.05; 6,500) 
167.21 
(743.32; 17,400) 
Source: Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 6 
Two Stage Least Squares Unitary Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Model  
Regarding the Proportion of Expenditure on Children’s Education in Single-Child Households 
Dependent
Variable:
Proportion of  
Household 
Resources Spent on 
Children’s 
Education 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Single-Child 
(1) 
Single-Boy 
(2) 
Single-Girl 
(3) 
Single-
Child 
Single-
Boy 
Single-
Girl 
Intercept -0.0865 
(-0.148) 
0.1830 
(0.249) 
-0.5014 
(-0.467) 
0.0551 
(0.0889) 
0.0550 
(0.0909) 
0.0551 
(0.0868) 
Household
Characteristics:
Log of household 
expenditure per 
capita (predicted) 
-0.0162 
(-1.603) 
-0.0196 
(-1.374) 
-0.0106 
(-0.699) 
8.0814 
(0.6959) 
8.0730 
(0.6742) 
8.0902 
(0.7182) 
Log of number of 
household members 
(predicted) 
 
0.1370 
(0.543) 
 
0.0200 
(0.065) 
 
0.3236 
(0.671) 
 
1.1637 
(0.1759) 
 
1.1669 
(0.1759) 
 
1.1602 
(0.1758) 
Communist Party 
membership of any 
member of the 
household 
 
0.0059 
(1.371) 
 
0.0101 
 (1.654)* 
 
0.0012 
(0.180) 
 
0.4138 
(0.4926) 
 
0.4194 
(0.4936) 
 
0.4078 
(0.4915) 
Two-generation 
household 
0.0482 
(1.242) 
0.0267 
(0.423) 
0.0627 
(1.393) 
0.9132 
(0.2816) 
0.9133 
(0.2814) 
0.9130 
(0.2819) 
Three-generation 
household 
0.0237 
(1.011) 
0.0118 
(0.271) 
0.0185 
(0.599) 
0.0813 
(0.2734) 
0.0816 
(0.2738) 
0.0811 
(0.2730) 
Characteristics of
Household Head:
Male -0.0068 
 (-1.887)* 
-0.0058 
(-1.205) 
-0.0087 
(-1.370) 
0.639 
(0.4803) 
0.6362 
(0.4812) 
0.6423 
(0.4795) 
Educational level -0.0026 
 (-2.039)** 
-0.0036 
 (-2.130)** 
-0.0024 
(-0.946) 
3.7016 
(1.4291) 
3.6724 
(1.4440) 
3.7328 
(1.4128) 
Occupation -0.0010 
(-1.165) 
-0.0003 
(-0.247) 
-0.0018 
(-1.475) 
5.6737 
(1.9232) 
5.6312 
(1.9236) 
5.7186 
(1.9223) 
Age-Gender
Composition of
Household:
Male aged 0-6 0.2094 
(0.335) 
-0.0559 
(-0.072) 
--- 0.0390 
(0.1052) 
0.0756 
(0.1367) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Male aged 7-12 0.2721 
(0.434) 
0.0072 
(0.009) 
--- 0.0566 
(0.1253) 
0.1097 
(0.1568) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Male aged 13-15 0.3673 
(0.586) 
0.1077 
(0.138) 
--- 0.0395 
(0.1078) 
0.0766 
(0.1402) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Male aged 16-18 0.3639 
(0.617) 
0.1201 
(0.163) 
--- 0.0301 
(0.0944) 
0.0582 
(0.1250) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Male aged 19-55 0.0130 
(0.218) 
0.0079 
(0.090) 
0.0234 
(0.245) 
0.3026 
(0.0983) 
0.3021 
(0.0986) 
0.3032 
(0.0981) 
Male aged 56-65 -0.0484 
(-0.917) 
-0.0275 
(-0.386) 
-0.0563 
(-0.603) 
0.0158 
(0.0634) 
0.0163 
(0.0642) 
0.0152 
(0.626) 
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Male aged 66 and 
over 
-0.0724 
(-1.095) 
-0.0676 
(-0.686) 
-0.0647 
(-0.608) 
0.0101 
(0.0506) 
0.0099 
(0.0496) 
0.0102 
(0.0517) 
Female aged 0-6 0.1971 
(0.315) 
--- 0.6192 
(0.531) 
0.0346 
(0.1006) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.0716 
(0.1352) 
Female aged 7-12 0.2771 
(0.439) 
--- 0.7007 
(0.594) 
0.0598 
(0.1284) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.1236 
(0.1618) 
Female aged 13-15 0.3512 
(0.572) 
--- 0.7593 
(0.661) 
0.0332 
(0.1008) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.0685 
(0.1362) 
Female aged 16-18 0.4056 
(0.678) 
--- 0.8011 
(0.718) 
0.0284 
(0.0873) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.0587 
(0.1249) 
Female aged 19-55 -0.0010 
(-0.016) 
-0.0288 
(-0.310) 
0.0394 
(0.362) 
0.3195 
(0.0653) 
0.3216 
(0.0850) 
0.3173 
(0.0897) 
Female aged 56-65 -0.0085 
(-0.143) 
-0.0241 
(-0.361) 
0.0433 
(0.316) 
0.0164 
(0.0603) 
0.0166 
(0.0648) 
0.0162 
(0.0659) 
Provinces: Yes Yes Yes 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(31, 3976) 
F(27, 2029) 
F(27, 1923) 
Number of 
observations 
0.1003 
0.0933 
 13.47*** 
--- 
--- 
 
4008 
0.1039 
0.0919 
--- 
 7.07*** 
--- 
 
2057 
0.0429 
0.0295 
---       
--- 
 8.87*** 
 
1951 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist Party  
 members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Instruments are ownership of telephone and type of house; see Appendix for first stage regression 
results. 
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Table 7 
Enrolment of Children Aged 16-18 in Upper Secondary Schools 
(number of observations) 
 Male 
(499) 
Female 
(512) 
Upper Middle School 51.3% 
(256) 
43.16% 
(221) 
Middle Level Professional School 17.03% 
(85) 
23.05% 
(118) 
Not Enrolled in School 12.22% 
(61) 
13.09% 
(67) 
Total Enrolment 68.34% 
(341) 
66.21% 
(339) 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 8 
Two Stage Least Squares Unitary Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Model  
Regarding the Proportion of Expenditure on Children’s Education (by Type of School) 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of  
Household Resources Expended on Education 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept -0.0367 
(-0.176) 
0.0551 
(0.0889) 
Household Characteristics:
Log of household expenditure per capita (predicted) -0.0109 
(-1.386) 
8.1370 
(0.3157) 
Log of number of household members (predicted) 0.1338 
(1.086) 
1.1062 
(0.2016) 
Communist Party membership of any member of the 
household 
0.0044 
(0.969) 
0.4564 
(0.4981) 
One-generation household 0.1151 
(1.246) 
0.1552 
(0.0871) 
Two-generation household 0.0487 
 (1.678)* 
0.7816 
(0.3622) 
Three-generation household 0.0033 
(0.236) 
0.0555 
(0.2291) 
Characteristics of Household Head:
Male -0.0068 
(-1.474) 
0.6593 
(0.4740) 
Educational level -0.0031 
 (-3.237)*** 
3.8015 
(1.5173) 
Occupation -0.0011 
(-1.482) 
5.5657 
(1.9401) 
Age-Gender Composition of Household:
Male aged 0-6 -0.0349 
(-0.839) 
0.0256 
(0.0862) 
Male aged 7-12 0.0342 
(0.778) 
0.0382 
(0.1046) 
Male aged 13-15 0.1218 
 (3.048)*** 
0.0270 
(0.0894) 
Male aged 16-18 enrolled in upper middle school 0.1510 
 (5.352)*** 
0.0108 
(0.0566) 
Male aged 16-18 enrolled in middle level professional 
school 
0.1584 
 (4.466)*** 
0.0034 
(0.0325) 
Male aged 16-18 enrolled in college and above 0.2349 
 (2.402)** 
0.0004 
(0.0114) 
Male aged 16-18 enrolled in professional school 0.0193 
(0.195) 
0.0005 
(0.0140) 
Male aged 16-18 not enrolled in school -0.0051 
(-0.117) 
0.0026 
(0.0283) 
Male aged 19-55 -0.0245 
(-1.367) 
0.2893 
(0.1711) 
Male aged 56-65 -0.0674 
 (-3.243)*** 
0.0653 
(0.1503) 
Male aged 66 and over -0.0699 
 (-2.459)** 
0.0299 
(0.1101) 
Female aged 0-6 -0.0436 
(-1.053) 
0.0235 
(0.0831) 
Female aged 7-12 0.0389 
(0.851) 
0.0402 
(0.1071) 
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Female aged 13-15 0.1080 
 (3.126)*** 
0.0237 
(0.0844) 
Female aged 16-18 enrolled in upper middle school 0.1885 
 (6.954)*** 
0.0093 
(0.0530) 
Female aged 16-18 enrolled in middle level professional 
school 
0.2595 
 (7.598)*** 
0.0049 
(0.0385) 
Female aged 16-18 enrolled in college and above 0.4370 
 (4.846)*** 
0.0005 
(0.0133) 
Female aged 16-18 enrolled in professional school 0.2446 
 (3.121)*** 
0.0009 
(0.0164) 
Female aged 16-18 not enrolled in school -0.0243 
(-0.529) 
0.0025 
(0.0264) 
Female aged 19-55 -0.0036 
(-0.153) 
0.3094 
(0.1634) 
Female aged 56-65 -0.0107 
(-0.340) 
0.0593 
(0.1492) 
Provinces: Yes Yes 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(40, 6547) 
Number of observations 
 
0.1008 
0.0953 
 22.29*** 
6588 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist Party  
 members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Instruments are ownership of telephone and type of house; see Appendix for first stage regression 
results. 
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Table 9 
Educational Attainment for Adult Men and Women 
(number of observations) 
 Men Women 
19-55 
(6438) 
56 and over 
(1774) 
19-55 
(6814) 
56 and over 
(1635) 
College and Above 9.68% 
(623) 
13.7% 
(243) 
5.00% 
(341) 
3.55% 
(58) 
Professional School 17.92% 
(1154) 
9.13% 
(162) 
11.48% 
(782) 
2.63% 
(43) 
Middle Level Professional School 15.77% 
(1015) 
10.71% 
(190) 
16.20% 
(1104) 
8.44% 
(138) 
Upper Middle School 23.72% 
(1527) 
14.43% 
(256) 
24.95% 
(1700) 
7.03% 
(115) 
Lower Middle School 28.56% 
(1839) 
28.86% 
(512) 
32.70% 
(2228) 
20.85% 
(341) 
Primary School 4.01% 
(258) 
18.49% 
(328) 
8.29% 
(565) 
26.54% 
(434) 
Less than Primary School 0.34% 
(22) 
4.68% 
(83) 
1.38% 
(94) 
30.89% 
(505) 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 10 
Predicted Mean Annual Income of Children in Yuan 
Children’s Educational Attainment Sons Daughters Earnings Differential 
College and Above 7,528.38 7,028.11 7.12% 
Professional School 6,622.82 6,302.31 5.09% 
Middle Level Professional School 5,994.66 5,812.54 3.13% 
Upper Middle School 5,528.95 5,423.29 1.95% 
Lower Middle School 5,575.43 5,359.46 4.03% 
Primary School 5,487.37 5,091.43 7.78% 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 11 
Educational Attainment of Spouses in Urban China, 1995 
(number of observations of married couples) 
Men 
 
Women 
College and 
Above 
Professional 
School 
Middle 
Level 
Professional 
School 
Upper 
Middle 
School 
Lower 
Middle 
School 
Primary 
School 
Less than 
Primary 
School 
College and 
Above 
60.47/24.76 
(182) 
15.28/4.22 
(46) 
7.31/2.30 
(22) 
7.64/1.79 
(23) 
3.65/0.55 
(11) 
0.66/0.39 
(2) 
0.00/0.00 
(0) 
Professional 
School 
18.51/16.87 
(124) 
41.04/25.25 
(275) 
15.07/10.55 
(101) 
12.23/6.37 
(82) 
8.51/2.83 
(57) 
1.19/1.54 
(8) 
0.30/3.33 
(2) 
Middle Level 
Professional 
School 
18.51/16.87 
(148) 
23.69/21.21 
(231) 
22.97/23.41 
(224) 
15.08/11.41 
(147) 
16.92/8.18 
(165) 
1.74/3.28 
(17) 
0.21/3.33 
(2) 
Upper Middle 
School 
8.04/15.51 
(114) 
16.57/21.58 
(235) 
13.61/20.17 
(193) 
34.70/38.20 
(492) 
21.72/15.27 
(308) 
1.48/4.07 
(21) 
0.00/0.00 
(0) 
Lower Middle 
School 
4.92/15.10 
(111) 
10.34/21.40 
(233) 
12.69/29.89 
(286) 
16.90/29.58 
(381) 
45.70/51.07 
(1030) 
5.90/25.63 
(133) 
0.49/18.33 
(11) 
Primary 
School 
4.20/5.03 
(37) 
5.44/4.41 
(48) 
11.45/10.55 
(101) 
12.47/8.54 
(110) 
35.60/15.57 
(314) 
25.17/42.77 
(222) 
1.13/16.67 
(10) 
Less than 
Primary 
School 
2.67/1.09 
(8) 
3.67/1.01 
(11) 
6.00/1.88 
(18) 
9.67/2.25 
(29) 
27.33/4.07 
(82) 
32.67/18.88 
(98) 
10.00/50.00 
(30) 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Note:      The largest percentage within each educational level is in bold type, where the percentage of women of each level  
 of educational attainment in rows that marry men of the educational level corresponding to each column is    
 denoted first.  The percentage of men by educational attainment in columns that marry women of each  
 educational level corresponding to each row is denoted second.  The notation is the percentage of women of each  
 educational level that marry men of each educational level/percentage of men of each educational level that   
 marry women of each educational level. 
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Table 12 
Predicted Mean Annual Income of Children and of their Likely Future Spouses in Yuan 
Children’s Level of 
Educational Attainment 
 
Sons 
 
(1) 
Daughters 
 
(2) 
Male-Female 
Earnings 
Differential 
Sons’ Future 
Spouse 
(3) 
Daughters’ 
Future Spouse 
(4) 
College and Above 7,528.38 7,028.11 7.12% 5,732.31 6,664.72 
Professional School 6,622.82 6,302.31 5.09% 5,701.34 6,242.95 
Middle Level 
Professional School 
 
5,994.66 
 
5,812.54 
 
3.13% 
 
5,492.40 
 
6,220.49 
Upper Middle School 5,528.95 5,423.29 1.95% 5,368.68 5,729.30 
Lower Middle School 5,575.43 5,359.46 4.03% 5,206.68 5,641.78 
Primary School 5,487.37 5,091.43 7.78% 4,811.91 5,463.87 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Note:   Author’s calculations based on Tables 10 and 11. 
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Table 13 
Predicted Mean Annual Household Income of Children in Yuan 
 
Children’s Level of Educational 
Attainment 
 
Sons’ Future 
Household 
(1) 
 
Daughters’ Future 
Household 
(2) 
Daughters’-Sons’ 
Household Income 
Difference 
(2)-(1) 
College and Above 13,260.69 13,692.83 432.14 
Professional School 12,324.15 12,545.25 221.10 
Middle Level Professional School 11,487.05 12,033.03 545.98 
Upper Middle School 10,897.64 11,152.58 254.95 
Lower Middle School 10,782.10 11,001.24 219.14 
Primary School 10,299.27 10,555.30 256.03 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Note:    Author’s calculations based on Tables 10, 11 and 12. 
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Appendix: First-Stage Regression Results for the Two-Stage Least Squares 
Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Models (Tables A1-2) and Estimated Earnings 
Functions for the Urban Sample (Table A3) 
Table A1 
Instrumenting for Household Expenditure Per Capita 
Dependent Variable:
Log of Household Expenditure Per Capita 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept 7.7613 
 (81.160)*** 
8.1366 
(0.7323) 
Household Characteristics:
Ownership of telephone18 0.1330 
 (14.762)*** 
1.7277 
(0.9265) 
One-generation household 0.6610 
 (7.094)*** 
0.1552 
(0.3622)  
Two-generation household 0.1917 
 (2.099)** 
0.7816 
(0.4132) 
Three-generation household 0.0262 
(0.270) 
0.0556 
(0.2291) 
Provinces:
Beijing 0.2075 
 (5.437)*** 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Shanxi -0.4150 
 (-11.743)*** 
0.0937 
(0.2915) 
Liaoning -0.1107 
 (-3.211)*** 
0.1010 
(0.3013) 
Anhui -0.2582 
 (-6.830)*** 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Henan -0.3637 
 (-10.081)*** 
0.0865 
(0.2812) 
Hubei -0.0910 
 (-2.671)*** 
0.1070 
(0.3091) 
Guangdong 0.3609 
 (9.367)*** 
0.0787 
(0.2694) 
Sichuan -0.0865 
 (-2.616)*** 
0.1223 
(0.3277) 
Yunnan -0.1260 
 (-3.587)*** 
0.0935 
(0.2911) 
Gansu -0.3327 
 (-8.113)*** 
0.0577 
(0.2331) 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(33, 6854) 
Number of observations 
0.1860 
0.1843 
 112.15*** 
6888 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist  
 Party members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households.   
Not all variables are reported for brevity. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are computed. 
 
18 There are four outcomes for ownership of telephone, ranked as follows: no telephone, telephone publicly 
paid for, private telephone and public telephone. 
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Table A2 
Instrumenting for the Number of Household Members 
Dependent Variable:
Log of Number of Household Members 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept 1.3758 
 (53.586)*** 
1.1063 
(0.2683) 
Household Characteristics:
Type of house19 0.0053 
 (4.228)*** 
4.3238 
(1.7279)  
One-generation household -0.7434 
 (-29.789)*** 
0.1552 
(0.3622)  
Two-generation household -0.2357 
 (-9.631)*** 
0.7816 
(0.4132) 
Three-generation household 0.0071 
(0.272) 
0.0556 
(0.2291) 
Provinces:
Beijing -0.0246 
 (-2.431)** 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Shanxi 0.0384 
 (4.093)*** 
0.0937 
(0.2915) 
Liaoning 0.0072 
(0.776) 
0.1010 
(0.3013) 
Anhui -0.0113 
(-1.122) 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Henan 0.399 
 (4.163)*** 
0.0865 
(0.2812) 
Hubei -0.0004 
(-0.039) 
0.1070 
(0.3091) 
Guangdong 0.0414 
 (4.195)*** 
0.0787 
(0.2694) 
Sichuan -0.0186 
 (-2.119)** 
0.1223 
(0.3277) 
Yunnan -0.0049 
(-0.519) 
0.0935 
(0.2911) 
Gansu 0.0190 
 (-1.743)* 
0.0577 
(0.2331) 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(33, 6897) 
Number of observations 
0.1340 
0.1297 
 30.74*** 
6931 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist  
 Party members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households.   
Not all variables are reported for brevity. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are computed. 
 
19 There are seven outcomes for the type of house, ranked as follows: single family unit with auxiliary 
rooms, one bedroom apartment, two bedroom apartment, three bedroom apartment, four bedroom 
apartment, ordinary apartment unit without or with shared kitchen and toilet, and single storey house or 
rooms without auxiliary rooms. 
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Table A3 
The Determinants of Income for All Working-Aged Men and Women (by Educational Levels) 
Dependent
Variable:
Log of 
Annual 
Income 
 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 
Mean Value or 
Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Men Women Men Women 
Probit Corrected 
MLE 
Uncorrecte
d
OLS 
 Probit Corrected 
MLE 
Uncorrected 
OLS 
 
Intercept 4.5525 
(---) 
6.3397 
 (26.366)*** 
6.3827      
(26.574)*** 
1.0595 
(0.867) 
6.3395 
 (30.116)*** 
6.2928 
 (29.818)*** 
8.7290 
(0.6015) 
8.5094 
(0.6671) 
 
Education 
Level 
Completed:
College and 
above 
-3.5194 
 (-2.799)*** 
0.6015 
 (3.910)*** 
0.5968 
 (3.873)*** 
0.4258 
(0.806) 
0.5803 
 (5.734)*** 
0.5901 
 (5.829)*** 
0.0968 
(0.2957) 
0.0500 
(0.2181) 
Professional 
school 
-3.4707 
 (-2.736)*** 
0.5079 
 (3.324)*** 
0.5042 
 (3.294)*** 
0.8892 
(1.638) 
0.5287 
 (5.440)*** 
0.5384 
 (5.537)*** 
0.1792 
(0.3836) 
0.1148 
(0.3188) 
Middle level 
professional 
school 
-3.6339 
 (-2.978)*** 
0.4400 
 (2.883)*** 
0.4352 
 (2.847)*** 
0.5049 
(1.059) 
0.4587 
 (4.761)*** 
0.4681 
 (4.857)*** 
0.1577 
(0.3644) 
0.1620 
(0.3685) 
Upper middle 
school 
-3.6631 
 (-2.928)*** 
0.4199 
 (2.766)*** 
0.4161 
 (2.736)*** 
0.3382 
(0.737) 
0.3147 
 (3.306)*** 
0.3226 
 (3.387)*** 
0.2372 
(0.4254) 
0.2495 
(0.4327) 
Lower middle 
school 
-3.9632 
 (-3.139)*** 
0.3309 
 (2.197)** 
0.3272 
 (2.169)** 
0.3480 
(0.772) 
0.1987 
 (2.100)** 
0.2062 
 (2.179)** 
0.2856 
(0.4518) 
0.3270 
(0.4691) 
Primary school -4.0891 
 (-3.159)*** 
0.2403 
(1.559) 
0.2359 
(1.528) 
5.3015 
(---) 
0.1050 
(1.080) 
0.1135 
(1.168) 
0.0401 
(0.1961) 
0.0829 
(0.2758) 
Personal 
Characteristics:
Age 0.0892 
(1.331) 
0.0865 
 (9.817)*** 
0.0844 
 (9.602)*** 
0.0397 
(0.681) 
0.0912 
 (10.477)*** 
0.0930 
 (10.659)*** 
37.8879 
(9.7425)   
37.6909 
(9.5860) 
Age squared -0.0015 
(-1.635) 
-0.0010 
 (-9.730)*** 
-0.0010 
 (-9.502)*** 
-0.0008 
(-1.092) 
-0.0013 
 (-12.134)***
-0.0013 
 (-12.317)*** 
1530.3910 
(726.3334) 
1512.4850 
(715.1966) 
Experience 
 
0.0370 
 (1.833)* 
0.0118 
 (4.424)*** 
0.0120 
 (4.457)*** 
0.0343 
(2.562)***
0.0248 
 (10.333)*** 
0.0249 
 (10.349)*** 
19.6987 
(9.5261) 
18.4391 
(9.04993) 
Occupation 0.0502 
(1.355) 
-0.0171 
 (-2.795)*** 
-0.0174 
 (-2.841)*** 
0.0559 
 (1.827)* 
-0.0265 
 (-3.911)*** 
-0.0260 
 (-3.827)*** 
5.7091 
(1.9060) 
6.0445 
(2.0866) 
Communist 
Party member  
4.8251 
(---) 
0.0941 
 (6.254)*** 
0.0948 
 (6.288)*** 
4.8998 
(---) 
0.1135 
 (5.852)*** 
0.1136 
 (5.848)*** 
0.2967 
(0.4568) 
0.1327 
(0.3392) 
Have children -0.7163 
 (-2.675)*** 
--- --- -0.6401 
(-3.120)*** 
--- --- 0.2165 
(0.4119) 
0.1752 
(0.3802) 
Provinces:
Beijing 4.5410 
(---) 
0.2956 
 (7.277)*** 
0.2954 
 (7.264)*** 
-0.1185 
(-0.284) 
0.2035 
 (4.376)*** 
0.2032 
 (4.367)*** 
0.0249 
(0. 1556) 
0. 0219 
(0. 1463) 
Shanxi 4.4274 
(---) 
0.2506 
 (6.412)*** 
0.2515 
 (6.423)*** 
4.4978 
(---) 
0.2505 
 (8.092)*** 
0.2511 
 (8.103)*** 
0. 0281 
(0. 1653) 
0. 0277 
(0. 1642) 
Liaoning 0.0019 
(0.004) 
0.1953 
 (3.721)*** 
0.1951 
 (3.712)*** 
0.0932 
(0.231) 
0.1877 
 (5.144)*** 
0.1877 
 (5.138)*** 
0. 0317 
(0. 1752) 
0. 0305 
(0. 1720) 
Anhui 0.0150 
(0.034) 
-0.0942 
 (-2.250)** 
-0.0943 
 (-2.249)** 
-0.3659 
(-1.246) 
-0.2046 
 (-3.532)*** 
-0.2053 
 (-3.538)*** 
0. 0248 
(0. 1557) 
0. 0241 
(0. 1533) 
Henan -0.3038 
 (-0.764) 
-0.3192 
 (-7.748)*** 
-0.3197 
 (-7.741)*** 
-0.0483 
(-0.114) 
-0.4266 
 (-8.471)*** 
-0.4261 
 (-8.449)*** 
0. 0278 
(0. 1644) 
0. 0264 
(0. 1604) 
Hubei -0.5016 
 (-1.855)* 
-0.0921 
 (-3.033)*** 
-0.0929 
 (-3.054)*** 
-0.0416 
(-0.118) 
-0.0358 
(-1.225) 
-0.0363 
(-1.239) 
0. 0407 
(0. 1976) 
0. 0379 
(0. 1909) 
Guangdong 4.7400 
(---) 
0.1027 
 (2.959)*** 
0.1040 
 (2.992)*** 
4.5054 
(---) 
0.0009 
(0.018) 
0.0009 
(0.019) 
0. 0235 
(0. 1514) 
0. 0217 
(0. 1458) 
Sichuan 0.1293 
(0.317) 
-0.0946 
 (-2.074)** 
-0.0946 
 (-2.071)** 
-0.3896 
 (-1.659)* 
 -0.3216 
 (-6.914)*** 
-0.3226 
 (-6.928)*** 
0. 0395 
(0. 1947) 
0. 0374 
(0. 1898) 
Yunnan 4.3650 
(---) 
0.1445 
 (4.142)*** 
0.1451 
 (4.150)*** 
4.5103 
(---) 
0.1288 
 (3.580)*** 
0.1290 
 (3.578)*** 
0. 0287 
(0. 1671) 
0. 0283 
(0. 1659) 
Gansu 4.5275 0.1716 0.1725 4.4911 0.2262 0.2265 0. 0163 0. 0160 
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(---)    (4.386)***     (4.398)*** (---)     (5.986)***      (5.978)*** (0. 1267) (0. 1254) 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
 
--- 
 
-0.0566 
 (-2.822)*** 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
-0.0448 
 (-2.552)** 
 
--- 
 
0.0128 
(0.0274) 
 
0.0171 
(0.0286) 
R2 --- --- 0.2127 
 
--- 
 
--- 0.2382   
Pseudo R2
X2 (22) 
Wald X2 (21) 
F(21, 5389) 
F(21, 6014) 
Number of 
observations 
0.2375 
 
92.07*** 
--- 
--- 
--- 
 
5938 
--- 
 
--- 
 1410.91*** 
--- 
---      
 
5907 
--- 
 
--- 
--- 
 67.11*** 
--- 
 
5907 
0.1814 
 
90.98*** 
--- 
--- 
--- 
 
6078 
--- 
 
--- 
 1728.86*** 
--- 
--- 
 
6036 
--- 
 
--- 
--- 
 
82.28*** 
 
6036 
 
Source: Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: less than primary school education, non-Communist Party members, and  
 Jiangsu province.  
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the household level are  
 computed. 
(4)  Joint F-tests on the coefficients for returns to schooling reject the null hypothesis that the difference between  
 men and women are equal for each level of education attained. 
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Parental Investment in Children’s Human Capital in Urban China 
Linda Yueh 
Pembroke College, University of Oxford 
Department of Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Pembroke College 
Oxford OX1 1DW 
Linda.Yueh@economics.ox.ac.uk
Abstract.  We test the extent of parental forgone consumption used instead to invest in 
children’s human capital by use of intrahousehold resource allocation models.  Using an 
unusual, comprehensive data set for urban China, we find more spending on boys aged 
13-15 but more on girls aged 16-18, suggesting that standard human capital theories and 
traditional perceptions of gender bias do not completely explain educational expenditure 
decisions.  The evidence from urban China is consistent, though, with human capital 
models which consider parental intertemporal preferences.  Also, our findings suggest 
that the perceived bias in favour of sons exists weakly in contemporary urban China. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers. I20, J24, D13. 
 
Keywords. Education, human capital formation, intertemporal choice, household 
behaviour. 
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The possibility of bias for sons is an often-asked question in China. The 
one-child policy may have popularised the traditional view of a preference for boys.  This 
paper investigates patterns in household expenditure on the education of sons and 
daughters to analyse whether there are such gender biases in contemporary urban China.  
We aim to measure the extent of forgone consumption of parents that is spent instead on 
the education of their children as a test of the models of parental investment in children’s 
human capital by using a strand of empirical models known as the intrahousehold 
resource allocation approach.  Finally, we will discern whether any such gender 
differences generate effects such as differential school enrolment rates of boys and girls 
with policy implications for gender inequality in China.    
This paper will first review the educational system of China, focusing on 
gender differences in school enrolment as an indicator of human capital.  This is followed 
by a model of parental investment in children’s human capital that may result in 
differential spending on the education of sons and daughters if intertemporal 
considerations are taken into account.  Section 3 introduces the intrahousehold resource 
allocation model to provide a measure of parental forgone consumption used instead on 
children’s education, providing an empirical test of parental investment models.  Section 
4 describes the data and Section 5 presents the empirical findings as to whether gender is 
a significant factor in the allocation of household resources toward the education of 
children in urban China.  In Section 6, we investigate whether any differential spending is 
 
 The model of parental investment in children’s human capital is Discussion Paper No. 15 in the Centre on 
Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance (SKOPE) series at the Universities of Oxford and 
Warwick.  Kind appreciation is also given to the U.K. Department for International Development for 
support.  Any errors are mine. 
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due to better returns to education for men.  If that is not the entire picture, then we turn to 
examine the potential role of intertemporal considerations such as future transfers or 
financial support for parents in urban China.  Finally, we conclude in Section 7 with a 
summary of our findings of gender differences in educational expenditure indicating 
differential investment of parents in their children’s human capital.  We aim to uncover 
whether the oft-perceived tradition of a preference for boys exists in contemporary urban 
China or whether traditions are changing. 
Evidence of pre-labour market gender inequality implies policy 
conclusions that are different from those based on post-entry inequalities in the labour 
market.  This provides a useful analytical separation in examining the factors concerning 
gender discrimination, i.e., differentiating between productivity-related differences 
generated by pre-labour market inequality, such as education obtained as a child, and 
those that pertain once men and women enter the labour market.  Any evidence would 
also point to the circular nature of gender inequality.  In other words, what happens in the 
labour market can affect decisions made prior to entry to the labour market (Rosenzweig 
and Schultz 1982; Sicilian and Grossberg 20011). 
1 Education in Modern China 
 
The modern Chinese educational system is generally comprised of primary 
(six years), secondary (six years, three years of lower and three years of upper middle 
school), and tertiary or higher education (varying between two and five years) (Knight 
and Li 1993).  Education is officially compulsory for nine years to the completion of 
 
1 Sicilian and Grossberg (2001) find that the most important factors affecting gender wage differentials in 
the U.S. are differences in human capital stock and occupational distribution.   
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lower middle school, though not always in practice (NBS 1997a).  However, overall 
school enrolment in China is high in 1995, the year corresponding to the data set used in 
this paper.  There are costs involved in schooling that fall into two main categories, 
tuition and fees, and other expenditures, which may include school uniforms, 
transportation expenses, and out-of-school or private tuition fees.  The mean value of 
tuition and fees is 398 RMB in our representative survey, while it is much less (153 
RMB) for other educational expenditures.  In total, these costs are estimated to be less 
than 5% of average household income, so children’s primary and secondary education 
will entail some but not great costs.  There are some differences in school quality as well 
with the better schools expected to be more expensive. 
There are not large gender differences in educational enrolment in urban 
China in the current period (see Knight and Li 1993 for similar findings in 1988).  Figure 
1 presents the possible paths in the Chinese school system and partitions enrolment by 
academic and professional schools into gender proportions, as computed from our data 
set discussed in Section 3.   
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In the Chinese school system, students attend lower middle school after 
completing primary school.  They then test into upper middle school or middle level 
professional school.  Middle level professional school generally takes one more year to 
complete than upper middle school and is typically the last level attained.  Those who 
complete upper middle school are likely to apply and test into college.  Professional 
school is an alternative to college.  Those who select into professional schools will likely 
take on administrative or clerical work, and those who do not continue will likely enter 
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4
the labour force as factory or manufacturing workers.  Those who opt out of school early 
on are still candidates for factory work in particular, given China’s growth in 
manufacturing capacity. 
Table 1 gives school enrolment rates for children aged 7-18 in our sample.  
The mean years of education for all full-time students is 8.77 with a standard deviation of 
3.83.  For boys, it is 8.86 years of education (with a standard deviation of 3.82), while it 
is 8.66 years of education for girls (with a standard deviation of 3.84).   
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
The gross enrolment ratio of all school-aged children was 94 percent, 
while it was 91 percent for girls and 96 percent for boys (UNESCO 1999).2
[TABLE 2] 
Table 2 shows that the ratio of enrolled girls to boys has stayed the same 
or improved from 1980 to 1995 for every level of education, although girls still lag 
behind at the secondary level and substantially behind at the tertiary level.3 Using a 1995 
rural household survey, Knight and Song (2000) find that boys are significantly more 
likely to be enrolled in school than girls, with the greater difference for upper middle 
school-aged children.  One explanation posited by Broaded and Liu (1996) is that 
educational aspirations are different for boys and girls.  In their study of Wuhan, boys are 
more likely to enter into advanced schooling while girls are more likely to enter into 
professional courses.  They posit that this is primarily the result of two factors – tradition 
and parents’ perception of future discrimination against women.  They also find that 
 
2 UNESCO (1999) uses the definition of school-aged children as given by the country (see NBS 1997b).   
 
3 Figures for rural and urban China separately are not available. 
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5
women are reluctant to be better educated than any likely future spouse for fear that they 
might risk limiting their marriage prospects.   
This customary reliance on sons and the argument concerning the role of 
tradition in fostering gender inequalities in education may hold for rural China.  In rural 
China, Gao (1994) argues that patrilocal marriage and patrilineal inheritance are 
important aspects of the structure of patriarchal society that did not change in the course 
of economic transformation.4 Even though marriage and inheritance in China are 
legislated to give daughters and sons equal privileges as heirs, patrilineal inheritance 
continues to be practised in rural areas with the result that sons are preferred to daughters 
(Lee 1998).5 Sons inherit property, live near their parents and support them in old age.  In 
a household survey conducted in the early 1990s, the Institute of Population Studies of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (IPS) finds that rural, but not urban, households 
show a preference for sons in the distribution of family property.  We discuss this survey 
 
4 Rural residences, for example, have traditionally been passed to sons and not daughters.  The introduction 
of cooperatives abolished private ownership of land, but it did not significantly affect patrilocal residence 
patterns, argues Gao (1994). The government advocated men moving to their wives’ home at marriage, but 
there are very few instances of this occurrence in rural areas.  China’s rural villages are usually made up of 
several large single-surname lineages.  Because land is limited, villages restrict outsiders from moving in.  
Rural residents see women who move in to marry as effectively of their lineage and their descendants are 
welcomed as part of the lineage.  Men who move in to marry are seen as outside the lineage and are 
excluded because all their descendants will belong to a differently surnamed lineage.  The great majority of 
rural Chinese women must marry or they will not have a home of their own (Gao 1994).  Most do not have 
the privilege of choosing to remain at their natal home because their village is unwilling to distribute land or 
residence to their husbands and children.  In this respect, daughters are unable to benefit their natal families, 
while a son, aside from having his own land, gains another portion when he takes a wife.  The periodic 
redistribution of land contracted for household production under the household responsibility system is 
based on the number of people in the household.  Finally, by remaining near his parents, a son will be able 
to care for them in their old age (Croll 1994).  Consequently, parents in rural China likely value sons more 
than daughters. 
 
5 Lee (1998), in her sociological study of rural-urban migrant factory workers in special economic zones in 
southern China, finds that parents discriminate against girls in favour of boys because of the perception that 
girls will eventually marry and move away so parents must rely on their sons in old age in rural China.  In 
many villages there are only primary schools and upper middle school often involves extra fees for room 
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6
in detail later in the paper.  Finally, in examining educational enrolment patterns in 1988, 
Knight and Li (1993) find that traditional values favouring the education of boys rather 
than girls appear to have been eroded in urban areas though not in rural areas.   
We will explore whether a preference for boys exists in urban China, or if 
there are other factors motivating the parental decision to educate their children.  To a 
large extent, due to the rural roots and migration patterns of the current cohort of adults in 
urban areas, we expect that rural customs will have an impact on parental attitudes in 
urban China.  This is likely to be compounded by the additional linkages of urban with 
rural China through grandparents and the extended family.  However, we hypothesise that 
parents are rational investors in their children in both rural and urban China, but face 
different constraints.  In other words, there are differences in the economic needs of urban 
and rural households that affect their decisions regarding investment in children.  A 
number of institutional factors in rural China may have caused parents to value sons more 
than daughters, giving rise to a tradition of bias toward boys.  As the view of China is 
often driven by the view of rural areas where the bulk of the population live, there is a 
perception of pro-boy bias.  We posit that tradition is often the historical product of 
practical necessity, and that rational acts under one set of circumstances, such as in rural 
China, will change when the context is altered, as in urban China with a different set of 
household needs and constraints.  Our findings may run counter to the perceived 
traditions within China, but might better reflect the practices of an urban population with 
different concerns.  In other words, traditions could be changing.   
 
and board when attending in towns.  Thus, she finds that parents educate their sons more than their 
daughters with the result that more boys are enrolled in school in some rural areas. 
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Further, in urban China, there is not evidence of two forms of explicit 
gender bias.  Widespread female infanticide has not been documented, perhaps on 
account on the closer monitoring of neighbourhood committees and the work place 
related housing arrangements.  Housing in 1995 was arranged by the work unit, so 
members of a work unit tend also to be neighbours.  Second, unlike in rural China, there 
is no observed popular pattern of arranged marriages, perhaps there is less need to secure 
networks of mutual assistance typically wrought through marriage in agricultural 
societies.  These differences reinforce the notion that gender bias is of a different nature 
in urban China and our investigation of gender bias is consistently conditional on girls 
living in their parents’ households.  Therefore, our study is to discern evidence of gender 
bias as it manifests in educational expenditure and school enrolment of girls in urban 
households. 
Becker (1993) in his book, A Treatise on the Family, identified the 
parental role in developing the human capital of children.  The investment in children’s 
human capital, under credit constraints, necessarily entails forgone current consumption 
for the household.  There is a strand of literature – intrahousehold resource allocation 
models – that could provide an empirical test of the extent to which parents will forgo 
consumption to spend on children’s education through discerning patterns of 
consumption within households (see Deaton 1989; Behrman 1997; Haddad, Hoddinott 
and Alderman 1997 for excellent overviews of this approach).  The degree of 
expectations of returns from children will vary among societies; however, we posit that 
parents invest in their children with an eye toward their own future utility as well as that 
of their offspring.  These intertemporal considerations can generate differential 
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8
investments in the human capital of sons versus daughters that are unrelated to preference 
or bias particular to a society.  We use the intrahousehold resource allocation models to 
investigate educational expenditure in China where there is widely perceived gender bias 
to provide a test of these models by measuring the degree of parental investment in the 
form of forgone consumption. 
2 A Model of Human Capital 
 
Adapting Becker’s three-period model, we introduce a final-period retiree 
who does not earn income and whose utility is comprised of consumption only, which is a 
function of transfers from his children and returns from assets, such as pension schemes.  
The utility function of parents of two children in the tth period is  
Ut = ut + (Wmt+1 + Wft+1 + Ut+1),    (1) 
 
where ut is their utility this period from consumption, Wmt+1 is the future income of their 
son, Wft+1 is the future income of their daughter, Ut+1 is next period’s utility, and  is the 
discount rate or subjective rate of time preference.  The utility derived from their children 
is assumed to be separable from the utility produced by their own consumption.  Utility 
next period, Ut+1, is comprised of consumption in the form of returns from savings 
invested in assets, At+1, and transfers from their son’s future household, Bmt+1, and from 
their daughter’s future household, Bft+1.
The marginal yield on assets, At+1, is Ra, while the marginal yields on 
investments in the human capital of the son and daughter with respect to the returns to 
their future income (Rmh, Rfh) and the portion of that which will generate transfers to 
parents in the next period (Rmb, Rfb) are given by  
Rmh = Wmt+1/mt, Rfh = Wft+1/ft, Rmb = Bmt+1/mt, Rfb = Bft+1/ft, (2) 
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9
where mt and ft denote the proportion of household income, Qt, expended on the human 
capital of their son and daughter, respectively.   
The intertemporal budget constraint is 
 
Zt + mt + ft + At+1/Ra + Bmt+1/Rmb + Bft+1/Rfb = PV(Qt), (3) 
 
where PV(Qt) is the present value of parental household income, comprised of Qt and 
expected Qt+1. In other words, parental household income this period consists of 
proportion of own expenditure (Zt) that include consumption, transfers to their parents, 
savings invested in assets for retirement, and proportion of expenditure that is forgone 
consumption invested in children’s education (mt and ft).  Household resources next 
period (Qt+1) is equal to the discounted value of all expected sources of consumption 
(At+1/Ra + Bmt+1/Rmb + Bft+1/Rfb), i.e., assets and transfers, which are the result of savings 
and investment in children’s human capital.   
An education production function provides that the adult earnings of 
children will be produced by human capital investment by parents and also on account of 
innate ability.  This forms a second set of constraint given by: 
Rmh = R(mt, Hmt) and Rfh = R(ft, Hft), (4) 
where a son’s income, Rmh, will be determined by expenditure on education by his parents 
(mt) and his ability (Hmt), and similarly for a daughter. 
The allocation between investing in assets or children when contemplating 
consumption next period is determined by a first order condition equating the marginal 
yields on the three sources of income in the third period:   
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A’t+1 + Bm’t+1 + Bf’t+1 = u/Rk = U’t+1, (5a) 
where u is the marginal utility of income.  The yields on human capital are expected to 
decline as more resources are invested, Rmh/mt < 0, Rfh/ft < 0, Rmb/mt < 0, and 
Rfb/ft < 0, Rmh/Hmt < 0, Rfh/Hft < 0, and will eventually equal returns to assets in 
this model including ability,6 Ra assumed to be constant.  Since Rmh/Ra < 0, Rfh/Ra <
0, Rmh > Ra and Rfh > Ra, the marginal rate of return is denoted Rk.
The next first order condition maximises parental utility and determines 
their optimal consumption in periods two and three: 
U’t = RkU’t+1 = u. (5b) 
 
The last first order condition determines investment in children’s human 
capital in terms of the utility derived from the future income of the children: 
RmhWm’t+1 = u, RfhWf’t+1 = u. (5c) 
 
Combining the first order conditions gives  
 
u/Ra = u/Rmb = u/Rfb = u/Rmh = u/Rfh, (6) 
 
which shows that the marginal rates of return on human capital for both the children’s 
future income and expected transfers equal the return on assets in both periods.  
Differential spending on sons and daughters can thus be efficient rather than solely a 
result of bias of altruism.   
The decision to invest in children’s human capital in this and other models 
in the Becker tradition will entail forgone consumption by parents spent instead on the 
 
6 The support for this premise is well established and can be found in Becker (1993) whereby investment in 
ability for children will generate more investment in the more able of the children until the marginal rates of 
return to the investment is equal for all children. 
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education of children.  There is a strand of empirical literature termed models of 
intrahousehold resource allocation which we propose would provide a direct test of such 
forgone consumption.  These models reveal the decision of parents in a household to 
spend on children’s education versus own consumption, consistent with the parental 
investment model as outlined above.  In so doing, any evidence of differential 
expenditure on the education of sons and daughters can also be discerned.  These models 
can be extended to investigate wealth or endowment effects as in Behrman et al. (1995) 
and for credit constraints, although we do not currently have data to do so.  Credit 
constraints certainly exist in China in 1995, a period prior to commercial credit 
liberalisation (Naughton 1996), and is so inferred in interpreting our results. Given these 
limitations, we posit that the intrahousehold resource allocation models provide one type 
of empirical evidence that can provide one measure the extent of forgone consumption by 
parents, albeit imperfectly.  At a minimum, they allow for inferences of patterns of gender 
bias among children for a given household’s resource allocation decisions, for which 
these models have been widely used in investigating patterns of consumption in 
developing countries (see Doss 1996 for an overview). 
The next section outlines the empirical testing we will undertake and how 
the intrahousehold resource allocation models can be utilised to test parents’ forgone 
consumption used instead on children’s education, consistent with the theoretical models 
which posit that such decisions are taken when parents who decide to invest in children’s 
education. 
3 Differences in Household Expenditure Patterns on Children’s Education 
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Intrahousehold resource allocation models seek to disaggregate household 
expenditure and determine whether the characteristics of a household affect spending 
decisions (see Deaton 1997).  For instance, Salm and Gerstle (2004) find that granting 
cash child allowance to Romanian households increases demand for child consumption 
goods using a model of intrahousehold resource allocation.  Another paper in Applied 
Economics also links household traits and education demand in Spain.  Beneito et al. 
(2001) estimate a household demand function for education and find that Spanish 
household characteristics influence the demand for secondary but not university education 
of children.  They consider several measures of opportunity cost, including expected 
future income, and the income strata of the household, and find these to be significant 
determinants of education expenditure at the secondary school level.  We also focus on 
household expenditure on children’s education and likewise posit that expected earnings 
will be important in China.  We differ in our estimation strategy in that we use the 
intrahousehold resource allocation models to test the notion of forgone consumption and 
also consider expected income for not only the child but also that of his or her future 
household.  Our model takes an intertemporal approach to the question, while agreeing 
with the theoretical importance of measuring opportunity costs and household resources 
in determining children’s educational expenditure.   
Studies of developing countries further suggest the importance of the age-
gender composition of the household in resource allocation decisions.  They tend to find 
that expenditure patterns favour males (see Deaton 1997).  Medical care for girls is a 
luxury good in that it is more income and price elastic than for boys in Pakistan 
(Alderman and Gertler 1997).  Regarding children’s education, DeTray (1988) finds in 
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Malaysia that the demand for girls’ schooling is more income elastic than for boys.  
Similarly, the education of girls is a luxury good in Vietnam (Behrman and Knowles 
1999).   
Household expenditures are also thought to differ with the degree of 
influence of women, suggesting a joint decision-making model (see Haddad, Hoddinott 
and Alderman 1997).  For instance, Hoddinott and Haddad (1994) find in the Côte 
d’Ivoire in the 1980s that doubling the cash income of women increases the household 
budget share of food and reduces the shares of alcohol and cigarettes. Haddad and 
Hoddinott (1994) also find in the Côte d’Ivoire that increasing women’s share of cash 
income betters the health status of boys relative to girls.  For Brazil, Thomas and Strauss 
(1997) find that increased female earnings are associated with a larger share of the 
household budget being devoted in human capital – such as health and education – as 
well as leisure goods, including recreation.  Song (2001), in a study of rural China in 
1995, finds that greater female bargaining power changes expenditure patterns in favour 
of health care and education, but does not reduce the pro-boy discrimination in these 
expenditures (for an overview of bargaining theories, see Lundberg and Pollack 1996).   
We use this approach to measure the decision of parents to forgo 
consumption to spend on education as a measure of direct investment in children’s human 
capital and also investigating any gender differences posited in the theoretical model.  We 
propose that this is a useful direct test of this genre of parental investment models where 
parents decide to give up current consumption in order to spend on their children’s human 
capital.   
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In line with this literature, both a unitary household decision-making 
model and a joint decision-making model will be estimated to determine the best fit (see 
Deaton 1997 for the theoretical underpinnings and restrictions of these models).   
3.1 Unitary Household Decision-making Model 
Derived from the specifications of the theoretical model, we transform the 
variables into the specifications of this set of empirical models found in Deaton (1997).  
The proportion of household expenditure on the share of household expenditure on 
children’s education is given by 
G-1  
et = 0 + 1ln[(Zt+et)/n) + 2ln(n) + 3(ng/n) + 4Xt + t, (7) 
 g=1 
 
where et denotes the share of household expenditures spent on the education of children, 
Zt+et is total household monetary expenditure, n denotes household size, ng is the number 
of individuals of age-gender demographic group g, ng/n represents the proportion of 
individuals of demographic group g in the household, Xt is a vector of control variables, 
and t is the error term.    
3.2 Joint Household Decision-making Model 
An alternative formulation takes into account potential bargaining as 
between parents concerning the education of their children.  A proxy for relative 
bargaining power is included.  The equation is now given by 
G-1  
et = 0 + 1ln[(Zt+et)/n) + 2ln(n) + 3(ng/n) + 4Xt + 5Emt + t, (8) 
 g=1 
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where Emt denotes the years of education of the mother as a ratio of the total years of 
education of both spouses, which is a proxy for female bargaining power.  We tried 
alternative proxies, such as women’s share of earned income to that of both spouses (see 
the proxies used by Hoddinott and Haddad 1994 for the Côte d’Ivoire and Song 2001 for 
rural China). 
3.3 Interpreting Patterns of Intrahousehold Resource Allocation 
 
As explained by Deaton (1989, 1997), because we do not have data 
regarding actual expenditure on the education of boys and girls but only on all the 
children in the household, the analysis is based on a correlation between the number of 
boys and girls in the household and the amount of forgone consumption.  This is 
evidenced through the variable, ng/n. From both the unitary and the joint decision-
making formulations of the model, the coefficient 3 indicates the relationship between 
educational expenditure and the age-composition of the household.  If 3 are significant 
and different for boys and girls, then there is evidence of differential investment in 
children’s human capital as seen through forgone consumption of parents.  Again, this is 
a direct test of parents forgoing consumption to spend on children’s education as well as a 
method to discern whether such forgone consumption and expenditure differ by gender.   
4 Data 
We tested our hypotheses using an unusually comprehensive and 
representative urban household survey conducted in China and related to 1995.  The 
survey has rich data on consumption and income for each household.  The survey was 
designed by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in 
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consultation with international scholars.  The households are drawn from a sub-sample of 
the NBS annual household income and expenditure survey.  Eleven of the 30 provinces of 
China are included. For details, see Riskin, Zhao and Li (2001).   
The pertinent descriptives are as follows.  There are 6,594 households and 
21,697 individuals, of whom 70.3 percent are aged 19 and over, and primary and 
secondary school-aged children (7-18 years of age) are approximately 17.12 percent.  Of 
such children, boys are slightly more numerous than girls (8.61 percent and 8.51 percent, 
respectively), and the gender ratio of girls to boys is 98.84.  In terms of age-gender 
demographics, boys aged 7-12 are 3.82 percent of household members, boys aged 13-15 
are 2.70 percent, boys aged 16-18 are 2.09 percent, while girls aged 7-12 are 4.02 percent, 
girls aged 13-15 are 2.37 percent and girls aged 16-18 are 2.12 percent.   
The mean proportion of annual household resources expended on 
children’s education is 4.69 percent (with a standard deviation of 0.09).  In absolute 
figures, it is 573 yuan or RMB (with a standard deviation of 1,219).  Total mean 
household expenditure is 12,222 yuan (with a standard deviation of 10,365), while mean 
household income is 14,290 yuan (with a standard deviation of 8,591).  As expected 
under the one-child policy, the mean number of household members is 3.13 (with a 
standard deviation of 0.83).  More than three-quarters of the households are two-
generations (78.16 percent), while one-generation households comprise 15.52 percent, 
three-generation households are 5.55 percent, and the remaining 7.65 percent are other 
types of household, defined as those with relatives other than the nuclear family or 
includes non-relatives.  The head of household is male in a majority of the sample (65.93 
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percent), and just under half of all households (45.64 percent) include a Communist Party 
member. 
5 Empirical Findings 
We first examine whether there are gender differences in parents’ 
expenditures on children’s education.  The results of the two-stage least squares 
estimation of a unitary household decision-making model of resource allocation toward 
children’s education are presented in Table 3.  The independent variables include 
household level variables as well as the characteristics of the household head in addition 
to city dummy variables.  The education variable is a rank variable indicating the level of 
education completed, while the occupation variable is also a rank variable indicating 
professional to unskilled workers.  We tested the robustness of the specification by using 
one-generation households as the omitted variable, for instance.  Different characteristics 
of the household head were also tried.  Our results concerning the significance of the age-
gender household composition variables do not change. 
Given the nature of household consumption studies, there are variables 
which could be endogenous to the system.  Accordingly, potentially endogenous variables 
were tested according to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Greene, 1997).  Instruments were 
selected according to the criteria specified in Bound et al. (1995).  Ownership of 
telephone proxied the standard of living of the household and household type ranging 
from flats to houses validly instrumented household expenditure per capita and the 
number of people in the household, respectively.  A detailed discussion of the instruments 
and endogenous variables can be found in the Appendix.  The 2SLS estimation is 
properly identified according to the Sargan test, the instruments were jointly significant at 
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the 1 percent level and the partial R-squared of the first stage regression is of reasonable 
magnitude.  On account of the rich detail in this data set, we were thus able to instrument 
for the endogenous variables to a good level.  Further details of the first stage regressions 
are provided in the Appendix.   
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Not surprising, there is a 4.98 percentage point increase in the proportion 
of household resources allocated to children’s education associated with two-generation 
households.  Turning to the age-gender household composition variables,7 we find that 
the proportions of boys and girls aged 13-15 and 16-18 affect the proportion of household 
resources expended on children’s education, but not children aged 7-12.  As education is 
heavily subsidised, this is not surprising for the younger age groups (see Knight and Li 
1996).  The proportion of boys aged 13-15 increases household expenditure on children’s 
education by 14.65 percentage points, while girls aged 13-15 increase expenditure by a 
 
7 Other significant variables include the education of the household head and the proportion of men aged 
56-65 in the household, along with a number of province dummy variables.  The education of the household 
head and the proportion of men aged 56-65 both have negative effects on children’s educational 
expenditures.  There are numerous possible explanations.  Regarding the education of the household head, 
as expenditure is a proportion of household income if better educated household heads earn more income 
then education fees form a smaller part of total household income.  It is also possible that we have only 
captured direct expenditure on children’s education and not indirect spending.  In other words, parents will 
invest a set amount of time and resources in their children.  More educated household heads may spend 
more time investing in their children by helping them with homework or perhaps spend time and resources 
on cultivating social networks to further the children’s future opportunities.  Less educated household heads 
may not be able to invest in these other respects and thus their spending is direct, while indirect 
expenditures and time spent are not captured in this estimation.  Other factors could also include providing 
health and support for their children, which could be reflected in parental time and their own forgone 
consumption.  The proportion of men aged 56-65 in the household probably include retirees who are not 
now earning income but may require additional expenditure on their consumption that will take away from 
spending on children’s education.  This corresponds to other studies in which adult men in the household 
are associated with an increase in spending on alcohol and cigarettes and a decrease in spending on 
education and health (for example, see Hoddinott and Haddad 1995).  Finally, as compared with the omitted 
province of Jiangsu, poorer provinces such as Liaoning, Anhui, Henan and Yunnan have significantly 
negative coefficients.   
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smaller amount (13.17 percentage points).8 The situation is reversed for boys and girls 
aged 16-18, in which the effects on household educational expenditure are respectively 
14.34 percentage points and 19.98 percentage points.  The results of this model suggest 
that there are differential patterns of household expenditure on the education of boys and 
girls that are significant for middle school children (ages 13-15 best correspond to lower 
secondary school while ages 16-18 best correspond to upper secondary school).  
Household expenditure patterns appear to favour boys aged 13-15, but girls aged 16-18.   
We next include proxies for bargaining power as between spouses to 
determine whether the unitary household decision-making model is the proper 
specification.  None of the proxies for spousal bargaining power is found to be significant 
(see also IPS 19949).  One set of estimations is reported in Table 4.  
[TABLE 4] 
The results in Table 4 correspond to the unitary household decision-
making model (Table 3) in that girls aged 13-15 are associated with a smaller proportion 
of household educational expenditure than boys of the same age cohort, while girls aged 
16-18 receive more expenditure on their education than boys of the same ages.  
Specifically, the proportion of girls aged 13-15 in the household increases expenditure by 
13.14 percentage points, while boys of the same ages increase expenditure by 14.65 
percentage points.  The proportion of boys aged 16-18 increases household expenditure 
on education by 14.33 percentage points, while girls aged 16-18 increases household 
 
8 Joint F-tests on all of these sets of coefficients reject the null hypothesis that they are equal for boys and 
girls of the same age groups. 
9 The survey conducted by IPS (1994) finds little difference in responses regarding household expenditure 
when spousal bargaining power is taken into account.  The several measures of bargaining power include 
spouses’ age difference, educational levels and proportion of earned income. 
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expenditure by 19.98 percentage points.  Joint F-tests on these sets of coefficients reject 
the null hypothesis that they are equal for boys and girls of the same age groups.  These 
findings provide further support that the household spends more on daughters in upper 
secondary school and sons in lower middle school. 
5.1   Accounting for school quality 
We attempted to isolate the effects of school quality by disaggregating 
educational expenditures to the extent permitted by our data.  Expenditures on children’s 
education comprise two items – expenditures on tuition and fees, and other expenditures.  
Tuition and fees serve as our best proxy for school quality, as we do not have data on 
actual schools in the survey.  By separating the two categories, we may find that the 
differences are a function of school quality insofar as better schools are more costly.  The 
mean value of tuition and fees is 398.80 RMB (with a standard deviation of 1027.85) 
while it is 153.87 RMB (with a standard deviation of 683.89) for other educational 
expenditures.  We cannot identify these other expenditures, but posit that they include 
school uniforms, transportation expenses and out-of-school tuition fees.  None of the 
coefficients on the age-gender household composition terms were significant and the link 
with school quality is not clear cut. 
5.2   Implications of the one-child policy 
We also explore the implications of the one-child policy implemented in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s on household expenditure on children’s education, i.e.,
families with one child will spend on their child regardless of his or her gender.  The 
cohort of school-aged children in 1995 is affected by this policy.  Table 5 gives the mean 
values for household expenditure on children’s education for single-child, single-boy and 
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single-girl households, as compared with all households with children that include single-
child households. 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
Single-child households represent 60.3 percent of all households with 
children in the sample.  Of these households, 51.6 percent are single-boy households and 
the remainder are single-girl households.  Single-child households spend 2.55 percent 
more on children’s education than all households with children.  Single-girl households 
spend more, on average, on children’s education in both sub-categories than single-boy 
households.  These figures suggest that parents are willing to spend more on education 
where there is one child, and also that there may be more associated expenses for girls 
than boys in single-child households, such as clothing, that are captured in the other 
expenditure category.  One possible explanation as to why tuition and school fees are also 
higher for single-girl households may have to do with girls testing into better schools with 
higher fees.  However, our discussion above indicates that our data set does not permit us 
to explore school quality.  Given these patterns, nevertheless, we may find that the larger 
educational expenditure associated with the proportion of girls aged 16-18 is explained by 
single-girl households.  Table 6 gives the results of the intrahousehold resource allocation 
model of expenditure on children’s education estimated for the sub-sample of single-child 
households, and further disaggregated by single-boy and single-girl households.  
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
The results of Table 6 do not shed further light on the degree to which the 
age-gender composition of the household affects expenditure on children’s education.  
Although single-child households are a majority of the sample of households with 
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children, the age-gender composition variables are not significant in these estimations.  
Therefore, the patterns of household expenditure on children’s education are not well 
explained by single-child households.  In sum, we find that the proportion of household 
expenditure on the education of children significantly differs for children aged 13-15 and 
16-18, corresponding to the two levels of secondary school.   
5.3   Academic versus professional schools 
Table 7 shows there are more girls enrolled in middle level professional 
school than boys, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total aged 16-18.10 
The reverse is true for upper middle school in which there are fewer girls than boys – 
again both absolutely and as a percentage of total enrolment.  It is possible that girls self-
select into professional rather than academic upper secondary school.  The testing process 
into upper middle school is another possibility.  However, it is difficult to distinguish 
ability from the influence of examination preparation at lower middle school that may 
result from more household expenditure on the education of boys aged 13-15.   
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
Our original estimation of the intrahousehold resource allocation model 
did not separate children according to whether they attended academic or professional 
schools.  To test for possible differences stemming from the type of school, we re-
estimate the household expenditure model.11 The results are given in Table 8.   
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
10 There are 499 boys aged 16-18, making the gender ratio 1.03 for this cohort. 
 
11 The estimated model is of the unitary household decision-making form since we did not find evidence to 
support a bargaining model. 
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As expected, children who are not enrolled in school do not affect the 
pattern of household expenditure on education (Table 8).  A larger proportion of 
household resources is spent on girls aged 16-18 regardless of the type of school (middle 
level professional school or upper middle school) than on boys of the same age-group and 
enrolled in the same schools (all coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level).12 Joint 
F-tests on these sets of coefficients reject the null hypothesis that they are equal for boys 
and girls of the same age groups.  We find that the coefficients for each set of boys and 
girls of the same age gr ups are statistically different.  These results confirm the results of 
our original estimation in which academic and professional schools are considered 
together.   
Therefore, our findings reveal that there is more spending on boys aged 
13-15 but more on girls aged 16-18, suggesting that standard human capital theories and 
traditional perceptions of gender bias do not completely explain the educational 
expenditure decision.  We next turn to examine whether these findings are consistent with 
models which consider parents’ intertemporal preferences.   
6 Returns to Parental Investment 
 
Standard human capital theory would suggest that the current educational 
attainment of the adult population and their earnings affect the current expenditure on 
 
12 In order not to omit observations, we include those children aged 16-18 enrolled in college and in 
professional school.  There are 11 men enrolled in college and above and another 11 in professional school.  
There are 12 women enrolled in college and above and 19 in professional school.  Despite their small 
numbers, the coefficients on educational expenditure on sons and daughters who are enrolled in college are 
positive and significant (at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively).  The coefficient for girls in 
college is almost twice as large than that of boys.  For those attending professional school, we find that the 
coefficient on girls is positive and significant (at the 1 percent level), but not significant for boys.  This 
lends additional evidence that more is spent on girls than boys aged 16-18 regardless of the type of school. 
 
Page 81 of 114
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
24
education and enrolment of children?  Table 9 and Figure 2 depict the educational 
attainment of the adult population, divided into working-aged men and women (19-55) 
and those aged 56 and over.   
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Using the earnings data in the survey, we predict mean annual income for 
men and women with each level of educational attainment standardising for the 
characteristics of their respective samples (see the Appendix for the earnings functions).  
These findings are consistent with studies of returns to education in China and in 
particular with the results of other researchers using this data set specifically to 
investigate returns to education (e.g., Knight and Li 1996). Predicted mean annual 
income is higher for sons than daughters with the average characteristics of the sample for 
all educational levels (Table 10).   
[TABLE 10] 
We conclude that parents spend more on the education of sons than 
daughters who are aged 13-15 on account of men receiving higher rates of return to 
education.  However, parents spend more on daughters than sons aged 16-18 in both types 
of upper secondary school.  The evidence suggests that higher rates of return to education 
cannot be the motivation in the latter case because men earn higher returns than women in 
upper middle school.  Of the possible explanations, it is also plausible that there are 
different kinds of families in the sample.  The parents who spend more on daughters aged 
16-18 may have also spent more on daughters at the time when they were aged 13-15 than 
on sons of the same age groups.  However, we are unable to test this outcome without 
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data for the same families from previous years.  We turn to another possible explanation 
which is that there are future transfers to consider when parents make investment 
decisions that are based not just on the standard returns to education for the child but on 
his or her future expected household income.  Because we do not have two generations of 
data on transfers to parents, we will estimate expected future transfers to parents based on 
assessing children’s future household income, which is consistent with the theories of 
parental investment when parents look ahead to expected returns in making current 
investment decisions.  
To obtain the expected household income of a child, we need to 
incorporate theories of assortative mating to predict the likely income of a child’s future 
potential spouse.  The predicted annual mean income of the children’s likely future 
spouse is the predicted annual mean income of men and women weighted by the 
probabilities of marrying a spouse who has attained each educational level based on Table 
11.   
[TABLE 11] 
Table 11 shows that 82.3 percent of women of each level of educational 
attainment marry at or above their own educational level, while it is less (55.5 percent) 
for men.  In the absence of perfect assortative mating, parents have only a probabilistic 
expectation that a child will marry a spouse with comparable education based on the 
distribution of the educational attainment of spouses in the current cohort of married 
couples.  In other words, a woman with educational attainment at or above the college 
level has a 60.47 percent chance of marrying a man who has attained the same level of 
education, a 15.28 percent chance of marrying a man with a professional school 
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education, a 7.31 percent chance of marrying a man of middle level professional school 
educational attainment, a 7.64 percent chance of marrying a man who has completed 
upper middle school, a 3.65 percent chance of marrying a man who has completed lower 
middle school, a 0.66 percent chance of marrying a man with a primary school education 
and probability of naught of marrying a man with less than primary school education.  
These weights are multiplied by the respective predicted annual mean income of men 
who have completed each level of education. If there were perfect assortative mating, 
then column (1) would equal column (4) and columns (2) and (3) would be equal in Table 
12.  The combined income of the child and that of their likely future spouse’s generates 
an expectation of the child’s future household income from which parents may obtain 
transfers, shown in Table 12. 
[TABLE 12 HERE] 
Table 13 gives the predicted mean annual income for the future 
households of daughters and sons based on their respective expected mean income and 
that of their likely spouse [column (1) in Table 13 is the sum of columns (1) and (4) in 
Table 12, while column (2) in Table 13 is the sum of columns (2) and (3) in Table 12].  
Expected mean annual household income is higher for daughters than sons for each level 
of educational attainment.  These are static expectations and may not accurately reflect 
the rapid economic changes taking place in China in 1995.  However, to the extent that 
parents act on available information, this exercise is useful in attempting to gain an 
understanding of parental expectations of future transfers.   
[TABLE 13 HERE] 
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We find that the smallest difference between the expected future 
household income of sons and daughters is for those who have completed lower middle 
school, while the largest difference is for those who have completed middle level 
professional school.  This coincides with our finding that parents invest more in sons than 
daughters aged 13-15 (corresponding to lower middle school) but more in daughters than 
sons aged 16-18 (corresponding to upper secondary school).   
Finally, by law children have an obligation to support their parents.13 In 
addition, approximately 80 percent of all persons are employed in the state sector in urban 
China that provides pensions.14 This may reduce some of the tendency to favour sons 
over daughters that arises in rural China, which lacks pension schemes and has a greater 
adherence to traditional preferences for boys discussed earlier.  When also considered in 
light of the large number of families with one child, there may also be a diminished 
expectation of relying on sons in old age.  This could reinforce the interpretation that 
there intertemporal concerns are strong, and there are indeed future transfers to consider.  
These explanations are also consistent with a degree of altruism in China, heightened by 
the one-child policy, which suggests changing traditions in urban areas. 
7 Conclusion 
 
This paper used a strand of models – intrahousehold resource allocation 
approach – to test the extent to which parents forgo current consumption to invest in their 
children’s human capital.  Utilising these models, we were able to measure parental 
 
13 See The Protection of the Rights and Interests of Old People Law (October 1, 1996), particularly Article 
11: “Children and their spouses are both to support their parents both financially, spiritually and of their 
particular needs.”  There is a counterpart in the criminal law providing for sanctions. 
 
14 Of the 15,233 employed individuals, the workplace is SOEs for 12,157 persons. 
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expenditure on children’s education rather than own consumption, providing a test of 
parental investment models for urban China. 
Our findings were that the proportion of household resources allocated to 
children’s education in urban China in 1995 is not well explained by examining only 
returns to education or a preference for boys.  If a bias for sons were the governing 
motivation, then we would not expect to find more expenditure on the education of 
daughters aged 16-18.  Rather, the evidence suggests otherwise.   
Insofar as expenditures on children’s education entail forgone 
consumption, parents are likely to be efficient as well as altruistic in their decisions.  This 
is reinforced by specific intertemporal considerations found in China, such as the 
expectation that parents in retirement will depend on transfers from children, as well as 
on assets, for consumption in an imperfect credit market and pensions system.  Moreover, 
the circular nature of perceived future labour market discrimination will affect the 
investment decision in counteracting ways.   
Future labour market discrimination will cause investment to differ for 
sons and daughters.  Given perceived gender earnings differentials, parents will invest 
more in the human capital of sons, in accordance with standard returns to education 
analyses.  A second consideration in our adapted model is expected transfers.  Favourable 
assortative mating will generate higher returns from investments in daughters than in 
sons.  This is owing to the same gender earning differentials that will cause daughters to 
marry spouses with higher returns to human capital and augment their future household 
income more than for sons.  We thus expect that parents will invest more in the human 
capital of daughters.  These two effects are endogenous and co-exist.  For urban China, 
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we find evidence consistent with these two effects.  With some limitations to the 
interpretation of the results, the empirical data calibrating household consumption 
provides some evidence of the human capital models. 
In conclusion, there are some – but not large – gender differences in the 
educational enrolment of school-aged children in urban China.  Despite more expenditure 
on the education of girls than boys aged 16-18, there is evidence that girls have higher 
attrition rates beyond lower middle school, are more likely to be enrolled in professional 
than academic schools, and expect lower returns to this education than boys.  Therefore, 
we find gender differences in urban China are the likely result of perceived earnings 
inequality that may in turn cause these children to receive unequal investment in their 
human capital prior to entering the labour market.  
[APPENDIX TABLES A1-3 HERE] 
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Table 1 
School Enrolment Rates (%) for Children Aged 7-18 
(total number of boys and girls) 
Age Boys Girls 
7 87.5 
(144) 
89.4 
(142) 
8 97.2 
(145) 
95.3 
(150) 
9 99.1 
(111) 
99.3 
(140) 
10 96.1 
(153) 
96.2 
(133) 
11 98.5 
(137) 
96.3 
(136) 
12 97.0 
(168) 
96.8 
(189) 
13 99.5 
(199) 
99.0 
(193) 
14 98.1 
(206) 
95.8 
(166) 
15 98.0 
(198) 
97.8 
(181) 
16 93.8 
(160) 
94.4 
(196) 
17 91.5 
(176) 
90.1 
(152) 
18 84.0 
(163) 
75.0 
(164) 
Total Enrolment Rate 94.6 
(1960) 
93.9 
(1942) 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 2 
Gross Enrolment Ratios of Girls in Selected Years 
(gender ratio of girls to boys) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
All School-Aged Children 71 
(0.81) 
70 
(0.82) 
79 
(0.87) 
91 
(0.95) 
Primary 104 
(0.86) 
114 
(0.86) 
120 
(0.93) 
117 
(0.99) 
Secondary 37 
(0.69) 
33 
(0.70) 
42 
(0.75) 
62 
(0.89) 
Tertiary 0.8 
(0.32) 
1.7 
(0.44) 
2.0 
(0.51) 
3.9 
(0.53) 
Sources:  NBS (1997b), UNESCO (1999) and World Bank (2000a, 2000b). 
Notes:   (1) The data on net enrolment ratios (NER), which would compute the ratio of the number of  
children of official school age enrolled in school to the number of children school age in the 
population, is not available for secondary and tertiary education nor is it complete for primary 
school in China (UNESCO 1999).  We report gross enrolment ratios (GER), defined as the total 
enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the 
official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given school 
year (UNESCO 1999).  As noted earlier, the GER is widely used as an alternative indicator to 
the NER when data on enrolment by single years of age are not available.  NER for primary 
education is reported in Note (2) to this table. 
(2) For primary education, NER for girls was 89 and the gender ratio was 0.92 in 1986, as  
figures for 1985 were not available.  In 1990, NER for girls was 95 and the gender ratio was 
0.96.  In 1995, NER for girls was 98 and the gender ratio was 1.00. 
 (3) For tertiary education, the figures are for 1996, as 1995 figures were not available. 
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Table 3 
Two Stage Least Squares Unitary Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Model  
Regarding the Proportion of Household Expenditure on Children’s Education 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of  
Household Resources Expended on Children’s Education 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept -0.0776 
(-0.374) 
 0.046915 
(0.0898) 
Household Characteristics:
Log of household expenditure per capita (predicted) -0.0088 
(-1.119) 
 8.137016 
(0.3157) 
Log of number of household members (predicted)17 0.1366 
(1.119) 
 1.106218 
(0.2016) 
Communist Party membership of any member of the 
household 
0.0051 
(1.135) 
0.4564 
(0.4981) 
One-generation household 0.1186 
(1.291) 
0.1552 
(0.0871) 
Two-generation household 0.0498 
 (1.706)* 
0.7816 
(0.3622) 
Three-generation household 0.0052 
(0.377) 
0.0555 
(0.2291) 
Characteristics of Household Head:
Male -0.0072 
(-1.548) 
0.6593 
(0.4740) 
Educational level -0.0033 
 (-3.373)*** 
3.8015 
(1.5173) 
Occupation -0.0012 
(-1.631) 
5.5657 
(1.9401) 
Age-Gender Composition of Household:
Male aged 0-6 -0.0096 
(-0.233) 
0.0256 
(0.0862) 
Male aged 7-12 0.0583 
(1.349) 
0.0382 
(0.1046) 
Male aged 13-15 0.1465 
 (3.719)*** 
0.0270 
(0.0894) 
Male aged 16-18 0.1434 
 (6.180)*** 
0.0209 
(0.0785) 
Male aged 19-55 -0.0027 
(-0.147) 
0.2893 
(0.1711) 
Male aged 56-65 -0.0440 
 (-2.061)** 
0.0653 
(0.1503) 
Male aged 66 and over -0.0404 
(-1.398) 
0.0299 
(0.1101) 
 
15 Mean value and standard deviation of the dependent variable are reported, and similarly in each table in 
the paper. 
 
16 The mean of the natural logarithm of household expenditure per capita (actual) is 8.1366 with a standard 
deviation of 0.7323. 
 
17 We use the logarithm of number of household members to better correspond with the proportion of 
household expenditure and age-gender composition variables (see also Song 1999). 
 
18 The mean of log of number of household members (actual) is 1.1063 with a standard deviation of 0.2682. 
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Female aged 0-6 -0.0191 
(-0.466) 
0.0235 
(0.0831) 
Female aged 7-12 0.0636 
(1.418) 
0.0402 
(0.1071) 
Female aged 13-15 0.1317 
 (3.852)*** 
0.0237 
(0.0844) 
Female aged 16-18 0.1998 
 (9.348)*** 
0.0212 
(0.0780) 
Female aged 19-55 0.0136 
(0.589) 
0.3094 
(0.1634) 
Female aged 56-65 0.0052 
(0.168) 
0.0593 
(0.1492) 
Provinces:
Beijing -0.00004 
(-0.007) 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Shanxi -0.0106 
(-1.324) 
0.0937 
(0.2915) 
Liaoning -0.0207 
 (-4.242)*** 
0.1010 
(0.3013) 
Anhui -0.0095 
 (-1.695)* 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Henan -0.0265 
 (-3.465)*** 
0.0865 
(0.2812) 
Hubei 0.0018 
(0.391) 
0.1070 
(0.3091) 
Guangdong -0.0070 
(-0.875) 
0.0787 
(0.2694) 
Sichuan -0.0049 
(-1.261) 
0.1223 
(0.3277) 
Yunnan -0.0100 
 (-2.021)** 
0.0935 
(0.2911) 
Gansu -0.0040 
(-0.616) 
0.0577 
(0.2331) 
 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(32, 6555) 
Number of observations 
 
0.0905 
0.0861 
 26.17*** 
6588 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any  
 Communist Party members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types  
 of households. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Instruments are ownership of telephone and type of house; see Appendix for first stage 
regression results. 
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Table 4 
Two Stage Least Squares Joint Household Decision-making Model  
Regarding the Proportion of Household Expenditure on Children’s Education 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Household 
Resources Expended on Children’s Education 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept -0.0794 
(-0.407) 
0.0551 
(0.0899) 
Household Characteristics:
Log of household expenditure per capita (predicted) -0.0088 
 (-1.118) 
8.1370 
(0.3157) 
Log of number of household members (predicted) 0.1369 
(1.145) 
1.1062 
(0.2016) 
Communist Party membership of any member of the 
household 
0.0051 
(0.0045) 
0.4564 
(0.4981) 
One-generation household 0.1187 
(1.313) 
0.1552 
(0.0871) 
Two-generation household 0.0499 
 (1.718)* 
0.7816 
(0.3622) 
Three-generation household 0.0052 
(0.378) 
0.0555 
(0.2291) 
Characteristics of Household Head:
Male -0.0065 
(-0.611) 
0.6593 
(0.4740) 
Educational level -0.0033 
 (-3.366)*** 
3.8015 
(1.5173) 
Occupation -0.0012 
(-1.641) 
5.5657 
(1.9401) 
Age-Gender Composition of Household:
Male aged 0-6 -0.0096 
(-0.232) 
0.0256 
(0.0862) 
Male aged 7-12 0.0583 
(1.340) 
0.0382 
(0.1046) 
Male aged 13-15 0.1465 
 (3.714)*** 
0.0270 
(0.0894) 
Male aged 16-18 0.1433 
 (6.120)*** 
0.0209 
(0.0785) 
Male aged 19-55 -0.0026 
(-0.145) 
0.2893 
(0.1711) 
Male aged 56-65 -0.0437 
 (-2.146)** 
0.0653 
(0.1503) 
Male aged 66 and over -0.0400 
(-1.466) 
0.0299 
(0.1101) 
Female aged 0-6 -0.0191 
(-0.464) 
0.0235 
(0.0831) 
Female aged 7-12 0.0636 
(1.407) 
0.0402 
(0.1071) 
Female aged 13-15 0.1314 
 (3.847)*** 
0.0237 
(0.0844) 
Female aged 16-18 0.1998 
 (9.305)*** 
0.0212 
(0.0780) 
Female aged 19-55 0.0135 
(0.565) 
0.3094 
(0.1634) 
Female aged 56-65 0.0051 
(0.162) 
0.0593 
(0.1492) 
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Provinces:
Beijing -0.0001 
(-0.009) 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Shanxi -0.0106 
(-1.338) 
0.0937 
(0.2915) 
Liaoning -0.0207 
 (-4.269)*** 
0.1010 
(0.3013) 
Anhui -0.0096 
 (-1.691)* 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Henan -0.0265 
 (-3.489)*** 
0.0865 
(0.2812) 
Hubei 0.0018 
(0.389) 
0.1070 
(0.3091) 
Guangdong -0.0070 
(-0.877) 
0.0787 
(0.2694) 
Sichuan -0.0062 
(-1.256) 
0.1223 
(0.3277) 
Yunnan -0.0100 
 (-2.023)** 
0.0935 
(0.2911) 
Gansu -0.0040 
(-0.615) 
0.0577 
(0.2331) 
Proxy for Bargaining Power:
Wife’s years of education as a proportion of the 
husband’s and wife’s combined years of education 
0.0014 
(0.106) 
0.6259 
(0.2997) 
 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(33, 6554) 
Number of observations 
 
0.0903 
0.0857 
 25.45*** 
6588 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist Party  
 members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Instruments are ownership of telephone and type of house; see Appendix for first stage 
regression results. 
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Table 5 
Mean Household Expenditure on Children’s Education for All and Single-Child Households 
(in yuan with standard deviation and maximums, respectively, in parentheses) 
Children’s Educational 
Expenditure 
All Households 
with Children 
Single-Child 
Households 
Single-Boy 
Households 
Single-Girl 
Households 
Number of Households 5802 4181 2158 2023 
Total Educational 
Expenditure 
602.11 
(1278.74; 33,033) 
617.85 
(1177.98; 33,033) 
610.46 
(1244.29; 33,033) 
625.75 
(1103.12; 12,683) 
Sub-category: Tuition 
and School Fees 
411.28 
(1063.94; 40,000) 
409.61 
(1092.57; 40,000) 
404.25 
(1168.71; 40,000) 
415.32 
(1005.28; 17,010) 
Sub-category: Other 
Expenditures 
161.77 
(709.31; 25,000) 
158.86 
(636.62; 17,400) 
151.03 
(517.05; 6,500) 
167.21 
(743.32; 17,400) 
Source: Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 6 
Two Stage Least Squares Unitary Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Model  
Regarding the Proportion of Expenditure on Children’s Education in Single-Child Households 
Dependent
Variable:
Proportion of  
Household 
Resources Spent on 
Children’s 
Education 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Single-Child 
(1) 
Single-Boy 
(2) 
Single-Girl 
(3) 
Single-
Child 
Single-
Boy 
Single-
Girl 
Intercept -0.0865 
(-0.148) 
0.1830 
(0.249) 
-0.5014 
(-0.467) 
0.0551 
(0.0889) 
0.0550 
(0.0909) 
0.0551 
(0.0868) 
Household
Characteristics:
Log of household 
expenditure per 
capita (predicted) 
-0.0162 
(-1.603) 
-0.0196 
(-1.374) 
-0.0106 
(-0.699) 
8.0814 
(0.6959) 
8.0730 
(0.6742) 
8.0902 
(0.7182) 
Log of number of 
household members 
(predicted) 
 
0.1370 
(0.543) 
 
0.0200 
(0.065) 
 
0.3236 
(0.671) 
 
1.1637 
(0.1759) 
 
1.1669 
(0.1759) 
 
1.1602 
(0.1758) 
Communist Party 
membership of any 
member of the 
household 
 
0.0059 
(1.371) 
 
0.0101 
 (1.654)* 
 
0.0012 
(0.180) 
 
0.4138 
(0.4926) 
 
0.4194 
(0.4936) 
 
0.4078 
(0.4915) 
Two-generation 
household 
0.0482 
(1.242) 
0.0267 
(0.423) 
0.0627 
(1.393) 
0.9132 
(0.2816) 
0.9133 
(0.2814) 
0.9130 
(0.2819) 
Three-generation 
household 
0.0237 
(1.011) 
0.0118 
(0.271) 
0.0185 
(0.599) 
0.0813 
(0.2734) 
0.0816 
(0.2738) 
0.0811 
(0.2730) 
Characteristics of
Household Head:
Male -0.0068 
 (-1.887)* 
-0.0058 
(-1.205) 
-0.0087 
(-1.370) 
0.639 
(0.4803) 
0.6362 
(0.4812) 
0.6423 
(0.4795) 
Educational level -0.0026 
 (-2.039)** 
-0.0036 
 (-2.130)** 
-0.0024 
(-0.946) 
3.7016 
(1.4291) 
3.6724 
(1.4440) 
3.7328 
(1.4128) 
Occupation -0.0010 
(-1.165) 
-0.0003 
(-0.247) 
-0.0018 
(-1.475) 
5.6737 
(1.9232) 
5.6312 
(1.9236) 
5.7186 
(1.9223) 
Age-Gender
Composition of
Household:
Male aged 0-6 0.2094 
(0.335) 
-0.0559 
(-0.072) 
--- 0.0390 
(0.1052) 
0.0756 
(0.1367) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Male aged 7-12 0.2721 
(0.434) 
0.0072 
(0.009) 
--- 0.0566 
(0.1253) 
0.1097 
(0.1568) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Male aged 13-15 0.3673 
(0.586) 
0.1077 
(0.138) 
--- 0.0395 
(0.1078) 
0.0766 
(0.1402) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Male aged 16-18 0.3639 
(0.617) 
0.1201 
(0.163) 
--- 0.0301 
(0.0944) 
0.0582 
(0.1250) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Male aged 19-55 0.0130 
(0.218) 
0.0079 
(0.090) 
0.0234 
(0.245) 
0.3026 
(0.0983) 
0.3021 
(0.0986) 
0.3032 
(0.0981) 
Male aged 56-65 -0.0484 
(-0.917) 
-0.0275 
(-0.386) 
-0.0563 
(-0.603) 
0.0158 
(0.0634) 
0.0163 
(0.0642) 
0.0152 
(0.626) 
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Male aged 66 and 
over 
-0.0724 
(-1.095) 
-0.0676 
(-0.686) 
-0.0647 
(-0.608) 
0.0101 
(0.0506) 
0.0099 
(0.0496) 
0.0102 
(0.0517) 
Female aged 0-6 0.1971 
(0.315) 
--- 0.6192 
(0.531) 
0.0346 
(0.1006) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.0716 
(0.1352) 
Female aged 7-12 0.2771 
(0.439) 
--- 0.7007 
(0.594) 
0.0598 
(0.1284) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.1236 
(0.1618) 
Female aged 13-15 0.3512 
(0.572) 
--- 0.7593 
(0.661) 
0.0332 
(0.1008) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.0685 
(0.1362) 
Female aged 16-18 0.4056 
(0.678) 
--- 0.8011 
(0.718) 
0.0284 
(0.0873) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.0587 
(0.1249) 
Female aged 19-55 -0.0010 
(-0.016) 
-0.0288 
(-0.310) 
0.0394 
(0.362) 
0.3195 
(0.0653) 
0.3216 
(0.0850) 
0.3173 
(0.0897) 
Female aged 56-65 -0.0085 
(-0.143) 
-0.0241 
(-0.361) 
0.0433 
(0.316) 
0.0164 
(0.0603) 
0.0166 
(0.0648) 
0.0162 
(0.0659) 
Provinces: Yes Yes Yes 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(31, 3976) 
F(27, 2029) 
F(27, 1923) 
Number of 
observations 
0.1003 
0.0933 
 13.47*** 
--- 
--- 
 
4008 
0.1039 
0.0919 
--- 
 7.07*** 
--- 
 
2057 
0.0429 
0.0295 
---       
--- 
 8.87*** 
 
1951 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist Party  
 members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Instruments are ownership of telephone and type of house; see Appendix for first stage regression 
results. 
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Table 7 
Enrolment of Children Aged 16-18 in Upper Secondary Schools 
(number of observations) 
 Male 
(499) 
Female 
(512) 
Upper Middle School 51.3% 
(256) 
43.16% 
(221) 
Middle Level Professional School 17.03% 
(85) 
23.05% 
(118) 
Not Enrolled in School 12.22% 
(61) 
13.09% 
(67) 
Total Enrolment 68.34% 
(341) 
66.21% 
(339) 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 8 
Two Stage Least Squares Unitary Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Model  
Regarding the Proportion of Expenditure on Children’s Education (by Type of School) 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of  
Household Resources Expended on Education 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept -0.0367 
(-0.176) 
0.0551 
(0.0889) 
Household Characteristics:
Log of household expenditure per capita (predicted) -0.0109 
(-1.386) 
8.1370 
(0.3157) 
Log of number of household members (predicted) 0.1338 
(1.086) 
1.1062 
(0.2016) 
Communist Party membership of any member of the 
household 
0.0044 
(0.969) 
0.4564 
(0.4981) 
One-generation household 0.1151 
(1.246) 
0.1552 
(0.0871) 
Two-generation household 0.0487 
 (1.678)* 
0.7816 
(0.3622) 
Three-generation household 0.0033 
(0.236) 
0.0555 
(0.2291) 
Characteristics of Household Head:
Male -0.0068 
(-1.474) 
0.6593 
(0.4740) 
Educational level -0.0031 
 (-3.237)*** 
3.8015 
(1.5173) 
Occupation -0.0011 
(-1.482) 
5.5657 
(1.9401) 
Age-Gender Composition of Household:
Male aged 0-6 -0.0349 
(-0.839) 
0.0256 
(0.0862) 
Male aged 7-12 0.0342 
(0.778) 
0.0382 
(0.1046) 
Male aged 13-15 0.1218 
 (3.048)*** 
0.0270 
(0.0894) 
Male aged 16-18 enrolled in upper middle school 0.1510 
 (5.352)*** 
0.0108 
(0.0566) 
Male aged 16-18 enrolled in middle level professional 
school 
0.1584 
 (4.466)*** 
0.0034 
(0.0325) 
Male aged 16-18 enrolled in college and above 0.2349 
 (2.402)** 
0.0004 
(0.0114) 
Male aged 16-18 enrolled in professional school 0.0193 
(0.195) 
0.0005 
(0.0140) 
Male aged 16-18 not enrolled in school -0.0051 
(-0.117) 
0.0026 
(0.0283) 
Male aged 19-55 -0.0245 
(-1.367) 
0.2893 
(0.1711) 
Male aged 56-65 -0.0674 
 (-3.243)*** 
0.0653 
(0.1503) 
Male aged 66 and over -0.0699 
 (-2.459)** 
0.0299 
(0.1101) 
Female aged 0-6 -0.0436 
(-1.053) 
0.0235 
(0.0831) 
Female aged 7-12 0.0389 
(0.851) 
0.0402 
(0.1071) 
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Female aged 13-15 0.1080 
 (3.126)*** 
0.0237 
(0.0844) 
Female aged 16-18 enrolled in upper middle school 0.1885 
 (6.954)*** 
0.0093 
(0.0530) 
Female aged 16-18 enrolled in middle level professional 
school 
0.2595 
 (7.598)*** 
0.0049 
(0.0385) 
Female aged 16-18 enrolled in college and above 0.4370 
 (4.846)*** 
0.0005 
(0.0133) 
Female aged 16-18 enrolled in professional school 0.2446 
 (3.121)*** 
0.0009 
(0.0164) 
Female aged 16-18 not enrolled in school -0.0243 
(-0.529) 
0.0025 
(0.0264) 
Female aged 19-55 -0.0036 
(-0.153) 
0.3094 
(0.1634) 
Female aged 56-65 -0.0107 
(-0.340) 
0.0593 
(0.1492) 
Provinces: Yes Yes 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(40, 6547) 
Number of observations 
 
0.1008 
0.0953 
 22.29*** 
6588 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist Party  
 members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Instruments are ownership of telephone and type of house; see Appendix for first stage regression 
results. 
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Table 9 
Educational Attainment for Adult Men and Women 
(number of observations) 
 Men Women 
19-55 
(6438) 
56 and over 
(1774) 
19-55 
(6814) 
56 and over 
(1635) 
College and Above 9.68% 
(623) 
13.7% 
(243) 
5.00% 
(341) 
3.55% 
(58) 
Professional School 17.92% 
(1154) 
9.13% 
(162) 
11.48% 
(782) 
2.63% 
(43) 
Middle Level Professional School 15.77% 
(1015) 
10.71% 
(190) 
16.20% 
(1104) 
8.44% 
(138) 
Upper Middle School 23.72% 
(1527) 
14.43% 
(256) 
24.95% 
(1700) 
7.03% 
(115) 
Lower Middle School 28.56% 
(1839) 
28.86% 
(512) 
32.70% 
(2228) 
20.85% 
(341) 
Primary School 4.01% 
(258) 
18.49% 
(328) 
8.29% 
(565) 
26.54% 
(434) 
Less than Primary School 0.34% 
(22) 
4.68% 
(83) 
1.38% 
(94) 
30.89% 
(505) 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 10 
Predicted Mean Annual Income of Children in Yuan 
Children’s Educational Attainment Sons Daughters Earnings Differential 
College and Above 7,528.38 7,028.11 7.12% 
Professional School 6,622.82 6,302.31 5.09% 
Middle Level Professional School 5,994.66 5,812.54 3.13% 
Upper Middle School 5,528.95 5,423.29 1.95% 
Lower Middle School 5,575.43 5,359.46 4.03% 
Primary School 5,487.37 5,091.43 7.78% 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
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Table 11 
Educational Attainment of Spouses in Urban China, 1995 
(number of observations of married couples) 
Men 
 
Women 
College and 
Above 
Professional 
School 
Middle 
Level 
Professional 
School 
Upper 
Middle 
School 
Lower 
Middle 
School 
Primary 
School 
Less than 
Primary 
School 
College and 
Above 
60.47/24.76 
(182) 
15.28/4.22 
(46) 
7.31/2.30 
(22) 
7.64/1.79 
(23) 
3.65/0.55 
(11) 
0.66/0.39 
(2) 
0.00/0.00 
(0) 
Professional 
School 
18.51/16.87 
(124) 
41.04/25.25 
(275) 
15.07/10.55 
(101) 
12.23/6.37 
(82) 
8.51/2.83 
(57) 
1.19/1.54 
(8) 
0.30/3.33 
(2) 
Middle Level 
Professional 
School 
18.51/16.87 
(148) 
23.69/21.21 
(231) 
22.97/23.41 
(224) 
15.08/11.41 
(147) 
16.92/8.18 
(165) 
1.74/3.28 
(17) 
0.21/3.33 
(2) 
Upper Middle 
School 
8.04/15.51 
(114) 
16.57/21.58 
(235) 
13.61/20.17 
(193) 
34.70/38.20 
(492) 
21.72/15.27 
(308) 
1.48/4.07 
(21) 
0.00/0.00 
(0) 
Lower Middle 
School 
4.92/15.10 
(111) 
10.34/21.40 
(233) 
12.69/29.89 
(286) 
16.90/29.58 
(381) 
45.70/51.07 
(1030) 
5.90/25.63 
(133) 
0.49/18.33 
(11) 
Primary 
School 
4.20/5.03 
(37) 
5.44/4.41 
(48) 
11.45/10.55 
(101) 
12.47/8.54 
(110) 
35.60/15.57 
(314) 
25.17/42.77 
(222) 
1.13/16.67 
(10) 
Less than 
Primary 
School 
2.67/1.09 
(8) 
3.67/1.01 
(11) 
6.00/1.88 
(18) 
9.67/2.25 
(29) 
27.33/4.07 
(82) 
32.67/18.88 
(98) 
10.00/50.00 
(30) 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Note:      The largest percentage within each educational level is in bold type, where the percentage of women of each level  
 of educational attainment in rows that marry men of the educational level corresponding to each column is    
 denoted first.  The percentage of men by educational attainment in columns that marry women of each  
 educational level corresponding to each row is denoted second.  The notation is the percentage of women of each  
 educational level that marry men of each educational level/percentage of men of each educational level that   
 marry women of each educational level. 
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Table 12 
Predicted Mean Annual Income of Children and of their Likely Future Spouses in Yuan 
Children’s Level of 
Educational Attainment 
 
Sons 
 
(1) 
Daughters 
 
(2) 
Male-Female 
Earnings 
Differential 
Sons’ Future 
Spouse 
(3) 
Daughters’ 
Future Spouse 
(4) 
College and Above 7,528.38 7,028.11 7.12% 5,732.31 6,664.72 
Professional School 6,622.82 6,302.31 5.09% 5,701.34 6,242.95 
Middle Level 
Professional School 
 
5,994.66 
 
5,812.54 
 
3.13% 
 
5,492.40 
 
6,220.49 
Upper Middle School 5,528.95 5,423.29 1.95% 5,368.68 5,729.30 
Lower Middle School 5,575.43 5,359.46 4.03% 5,206.68 5,641.78 
Primary School 5,487.37 5,091.43 7.78% 4,811.91 5,463.87 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Note:   Author’s calculations based on Tables 10 and 11. 
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Table 13 
Predicted Mean Annual Household Income of Children in Yuan 
 
Children’s Level of Educational 
Attainment 
 
Sons’ Future 
Household 
(1) 
 
Daughters’ Future 
Household 
(2) 
Daughters’-Sons’ 
Household Income 
Difference 
(2)-(1) 
College and Above 13,260.69 13,692.83 432.14 
Professional School 12,324.15 12,545.25 221.10 
Middle Level Professional School 11,487.05 12,033.03 545.98 
Upper Middle School 10,897.64 11,152.58 254.95 
Lower Middle School 10,782.10 11,001.24 219.14 
Primary School 10,299.27 10,555.30 256.03 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Note:    Author’s calculations based on Tables 10, 11 and 12. 
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Appendix: First-Stage Regression Results for the Two-Stage Least Squares 
Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Models (Tables A1-2) and Estimated Earnings 
Functions for the Urban Sample (Table A3) 
Table A1 
Instrumenting for Household Expenditure Per Capita 
Dependent Variable:
Log of Household Expenditure Per Capita 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept 7.7613 
 (81.160)*** 
8.1366 
(0.7323) 
Household Characteristics:
Ownership of telephone19 0.1330 
 (14.762)*** 
1.7277 
(0.9265) 
One-generation household 0.6610 
 (7.094)*** 
0.1552 
(0.3622)  
Two-generation household 0.1917 
 (2.099)** 
0.7816 
(0.4132) 
Three-generation household 0.0262 
(0.270) 
0.0556 
(0.2291) 
Provinces:
Beijing 0.2075 
 (5.437)*** 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Shanxi -0.4150 
 (-11.743)*** 
0.0937 
(0.2915) 
Liaoning -0.1107 
 (-3.211)*** 
0.1010 
(0.3013) 
Anhui -0.2582 
 (-6.830)*** 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Henan -0.3637 
 (-10.081)*** 
0.0865 
(0.2812) 
Hubei -0.0910 
 (-2.671)*** 
0.1070 
(0.3091) 
Guangdong 0.3609 
 (9.367)*** 
0.0787 
(0.2694) 
Sichuan -0.0865 
 (-2.616)*** 
0.1223 
(0.3277) 
Yunnan -0.1260 
 (-3.587)*** 
0.0935 
(0.2911) 
Gansu -0.3327 
 (-8.113)*** 
0.0577 
(0.2331) 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(33, 6854) 
Number of observations 
0.1860 
0.1843 
 112.15*** 
6888 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist  
 Party members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households.   
Not all variables are reported for brevity. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are computed. 
 
19 There are four outcomes for ownership of telephone, ranked as follows: no telephone, telephone publicly 
paid for, private telephone and public telephone. 
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Table A2 
Instrumenting for the Number of Household Members 
Dependent Variable:
Log of Number of Household Members 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Mean Value or Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Intercept 1.3758 
 (53.586)*** 
1.1063 
(0.2683) 
Household Characteristics:
Type of house20 0.0053 
 (4.228)*** 
4.3238 
(1.7279)  
One-generation household -0.7434 
 (-29.789)*** 
0.1552 
(0.3622)  
Two-generation household -0.2357 
 (-9.631)*** 
0.7816 
(0.4132) 
Three-generation household 0.0071 
(0.272) 
0.0556 
(0.2291) 
Provinces:
Beijing -0.0246 
 (-2.431)** 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Shanxi 0.0384 
 (4.093)*** 
0.0937 
(0.2915) 
Liaoning 0.0072 
(0.776) 
0.1010 
(0.3013) 
Anhui -0.0113 
(-1.122) 
0.0721 
(0.2587) 
Henan 0.399 
 (4.163)*** 
0.0865 
(0.2812) 
Hubei -0.0004 
(-0.039) 
0.1070 
(0.3091) 
Guangdong 0.0414 
 (4.195)*** 
0.0787 
(0.2694) 
Sichuan -0.0186 
 (-2.119)** 
0.1223 
(0.3277) 
Yunnan -0.0049 
(-0.519) 
0.0935 
(0.2911) 
Gansu 0.0190 
 (-1.743)* 
0.0577 
(0.2331) 
R2
Adjusted R2
F(33, 6897) 
Number of observations 
0.1340 
0.1297 
 30.74*** 
6931 
 
Source:  Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: female household head, households without any Communist  
 Party members, females aged 66 and over, Jiangsu province and other types of households.   
Not all variables are reported for brevity. 
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are computed. 
 
20 There are seven outcomes for the type of house, ranked as follows: single family unit with auxiliary 
rooms, one bedroom apartment, two bedroom apartment, three bedroom apartment, four bedroom 
apartment, ordinary apartment unit without or with shared kitchen and toilet, and single storey house or 
rooms without auxiliary rooms. 
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Table A3 
The Determinants of Income for All Working-Aged Men and Women (by Educational Levels) 
Dependent
Variable:
Log of 
Annual 
Income 
 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 
Mean Value or 
Percentage 
(standard deviation) 
Men Women Men Women 
Probit Corrected 
MLE 
Uncorrected 
OLS 
 Probit Corrected 
MLE 
Uncorrected 
OLS 
 
Intercept 4.5525 
(---) 
6.3397 
 (26.366)*** 
6.3827      
(26.574)*** 
1.0595 
(0.867) 
6.3395 
 (30.116)*** 
6.2928 
 (29.818)*** 
8.7290 
(0.6015) 
8.5094 
(0.6671) 
 
Education 
Level 
Completed:
College and 
above 
-3.5194 
 (-2.799)*** 
0.6015 
 (3.910)*** 
0.5968 
 (3.873)*** 
0.4258 
(0.806) 
0.5803 
 (5.734)*** 
0.5901 
 (5.829)*** 
0.0968 
(0.2957) 
0.0500 
(0.2181) 
Professional 
school 
-3.4707 
 (-2.736)*** 
0.5079 
 (3.324)*** 
0.5042 
 (3.294)*** 
0.8892 
(1.638) 
0.5287 
 (5.440)*** 
0.5384 
 (5.537)*** 
0.1792 
(0.3836) 
0.1148 
(0.3188) 
Middle level 
professional 
school 
-3.6339 
 (-2.978)*** 
0.4400 
 (2.883)*** 
0.4352 
 (2.847)*** 
0.5049 
(1.059) 
0.4587 
 (4.761)*** 
0.4681 
 (4.857)*** 
0.1577 
(0.3644) 
0.1620 
(0.3685) 
Upper middle 
school 
-3.6631 
 (-2.928)*** 
0.4199 
 (2.766)*** 
0.4161 
 (2.736)*** 
0.3382 
(0.737) 
0.3147 
 (3.306)*** 
0.3226 
 (3.387)*** 
0.2372 
(0.4254) 
0.2495 
(0.4327) 
Lower middle 
school 
-3.9632 
 (-3.139)*** 
0.3309 
 (2.197)** 
0.3272 
 (2.169)** 
0.3480 
(0.772) 
0.1987 
 (2.100)** 
0.2062 
 (2.179)** 
0.2856 
(0.4518) 
0.3270 
(0.4691) 
Primary school -4.0891 
 (-3.159)*** 
0.2403 
(1.559) 
0.2359 
(1.528) 
5.3015 
(---) 
0.1050 
(1.080) 
0.1135 
(1.168) 
0.0401 
(0.1961) 
0.0829 
(0.2758) 
Personal 
Characteristics:
Age 0.0892 
(1.331) 
0.0865 
 (9.817)*** 
0.0844 
 (9.602)*** 
0.0397 
(0.681) 
0.0912 
 (10.477)*** 
0.0930 
 (10.659)*** 
37.8879 
(9.7425)   
37.6909 
(9.5860) 
Age squared -0.0015 
(-1.635) 
-0.0010 
 (-9.730)*** 
-0.0010 
 (-9.502)*** 
-0.0008 
(-1.092) 
-0.0013 
 (-12.134)***
-0.0013 
 (-12.317)*** 
1530.3910 
(726.3334) 
1512.4850 
(715.1966) 
Experience 
 
0.0370 
 (1.833)* 
0.0118 
 (4.424)*** 
0.0120 
 (4.457)*** 
0.0343 
(2.562)***
0.0248 
 (10.333)*** 
0.0249 
 (10.349)*** 
19.6987 
(9.5261) 
18.4391 
(9.04993) 
Occupation 0.0502 
(1.355) 
-0.0171 
 (-2.795)*** 
-0.0174 
 (-2.841)*** 
0.0559 
 (1.827)* 
-0.0265 
 (-3.911)*** 
-0.0260 
 (-3.827)*** 
5.7091 
(1.9060) 
6.0445 
(2.0866) 
Communist 
Party member  
4.8251 
(---) 
0.0941 
 (6.254)*** 
0.0948 
 (6.288)*** 
4.8998 
(---) 
0.1135 
 (5.852)*** 
0.1136 
 (5.848)*** 
0.2967 
(0.4568) 
0.1327 
(0.3392) 
Have children -0.7163 
 (-2.675)*** 
--- --- -0.6401 
(-3.120)*** 
--- --- 0.2165 
(0.4119) 
0.1752 
(0.3802) 
Provinces:
Beijing 4.5410 
(---) 
0.2956 
 (7.277)*** 
0.2954 
 (7.264)*** 
-0.1185 
(-0.284) 
0.2035 
 (4.376)*** 
0.2032 
 (4.367)*** 
0.0249 
(0. 1556) 
0. 0219 
(0. 1463) 
Shanxi 4.4274 
(---) 
0.2506 
 (6.412)*** 
0.2515 
 (6.423)*** 
4.4978 
(---) 
0.2505 
 (8.092)*** 
0.2511 
 (8.103)*** 
0. 0281 
(0. 1653) 
0. 0277 
(0. 1642) 
Liaoning 0.0019 
(0.004) 
0.1953 
 (3.721)*** 
0.1951 
 (3.712)*** 
0.0932 
(0.231) 
0.1877 
 (5.144)*** 
0.1877 
 (5.138)*** 
0. 0317 
(0. 1752) 
0. 0305 
(0. 1720) 
Anhui 0.0150 
(0.034) 
-0.0942 
 (-2.250)** 
-0.0943 
 (-2.249)** 
-0.3659 
(-1.246) 
-0.2046 
 (-3.532)*** 
-0.2053 
 (-3.538)*** 
0. 0248 
(0. 1557) 
0. 0241 
(0. 1533) 
Henan -0.3038 
 (-0.764) 
-0.3192 
 (-7.748)*** 
-0.3197 
 (-7.741)*** 
-0.0483 
(-0.114) 
-0.4266 
 (-8.471)*** 
-0.4261 
 (-8.449)*** 
0. 0278 
(0. 1644) 
0. 0264 
(0. 1604) 
Hubei -0.5016 
 (-1.855)* 
-0.0921 
 (-3.033)*** 
-0.0929 
 (-3.054)*** 
-0.0416 
(-0.118) 
-0.0358 
(-1.225) 
-0.0363 
(-1.239) 
0. 0407 
(0. 1976) 
0. 0379 
(0. 1909) 
Guangdong 4.7400 
(---) 
0.1027 
 (2.959)*** 
0.1040 
 (2.992)*** 
4.5054 
(---) 
0.0009 
(0.018) 
0.0009 
(0.019) 
0. 0235 
(0. 1514) 
0. 0217 
(0. 1458) 
Sichuan 0.1293 
(0.317) 
-0.0946 
 (-2.074)** 
-0.0946 
 (-2.071)** 
-0.3896 
(-1.659)* 
 -0.3216 
 (-6.914)*** 
-0.3226 
 (-6.928)*** 
0. 0395 
(0. 1947) 
0. 0374 
(0. 1898) 
Yunnan 4.3650 
(---) 
0.1445 
 (4.142)*** 
0.1451 
 (4.150)*** 
4.5103 
(---) 
0.1288 
 (3.580)*** 
0.1290 
 (3.578)*** 
0. 0287 
(0. 1671) 
0. 0283 
(0. 1659) 
Gansu 4.5275 
(---) 
0.1716 
 (4.386)*** 
0.1725 
 (4.398)*** 
4.4911 
(---) 
0.2262 
 (5.986)*** 
0.2265 
 (5.978)*** 
0. 0163 
(0. 1267) 
0. 0160 
(0. 1254) 
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Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
 
--- 
 
-0.0566 
 (-2.822)*** 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
-0.0448 
 (-2.552)** 
 
--- 
 
0.0128 
(0.0274) 
 
0.0171 
(0.0286) 
R2 --- --- 0.2127 
 
--- 
 
--- 0.2382   
Pseudo R2
X2 (22) 
Wald X2 (21) 
F(21, 5389) 
F(21, 6014) 
Number of 
observations 
0.2375 
 
92.07*** 
--- 
--- 
--- 
 
5938 
--- 
 
--- 
 1410.91*** 
--- 
---      
 
5907 
--- 
 
--- 
--- 
 67.11*** 
--- 
 
5907 
0.1814 
 
90.98*** 
--- 
--- 
--- 
 
6078 
--- 
 
--- 
 1728.86*** 
--- 
--- 
 
6036 
--- 
 
--- 
--- 
 
82.28*** 
 
6036 
 
Source: Urban Household Survey, 1995. 
Notes: (1)  Omitted dummy variables are: less than primary school education, non-Communist Party members, and  
 Jiangsu province.  
(2)  *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
(3)  Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the household level are  
 computed. 
(4)  Joint F-tests on the coefficients for returns to schooling reject the null hypothesis that the difference between  
 men and women are equal for each level of education attained. 
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